their precise remit, belie the idea that the rulers of the Odrysian kingdom
were traditionally opposed to Athenian interests in the north Aegean.
There were instances where strategies did become polarized; but, in
general, cooperation seems to have been driven by an awareness of
mutual self-interest. Successive Athenian government officials recog-
nized that dealing with the Odrysian kings and princes benefited Athen-
ian interests, while Odrysian rulers also benefited from a benevolent
approach on the part of the largest naval power in the Aegean.^77
What was the reasoning behind these various diplomatic arrange-
ments? Part of the answer lies in the vastly superior resources that the
rulers of Macedonia and Odrysian Thrace could draw on. The Odrysians
undoubtedly were the principal landward power east of the Strymon
delta until the middle decade of the fourth century, when Macedonian
control began to move eastwards, with the capture of Chalkidide, then
Amphipolis and Krenides, which was to become Philippoi. Xenophon
challenged Seuthes to pay him and the mercenary army 30T, for just over
a month’s pay (Anab. 7.7.25).^78 This was the kind of sum that the
Athenians charged in annual tribute of the Thasians, twice the sum
charged of the Byzantines (15.4300T to be exact), or of the Abderites
(15T) in the previous half century.^79 The mining resources of the Tha-
sians were evidently common knowledge. Herodotus describes revenues
from those on the mainland that the Thasians also operated as 80T per
annum, before these were wrested from them by the Athenians following
the island community’s revolt in 465– 2 bc(Hdt. 6.46; Thuc. 1.100.2).
(^77) Thuc. 2.29.1–5; Diod. 12.50.1–2; Ar. Acharn. 145 (Athenian treaty of 431bcwith king
Sitalkes, with the mediation of Nymphodoros of Abdera, while Sitalkes’son Sadokos was
made an Athenian citizen); Hdt. 7.137; Thuc. 2.67 (Peloponnesian delegation detained by
Sitalkes at Bisanthe, 430/29bc); Archibald 1998, 118–20 with discussion;IGII 2 21
(fragmentary inscription from Athens referring to an alliance with Seuthes (II?)) and 22
(alliance between Athens and Medokos, includingproxeniafor Medokos (?)) have usually
been datedc.390/89bc: see Archibald 1998, 125 and n.152 with references; see above, Ch. 2,
n.16 for the treaty with Hebryzelmis (IGII2 31);RO47 (= treaty between Athens and the
Thracian kings, 357bc);RO53 (= alliance between Athens, Thracian, Paionian, and Illyrian
kings, 356/5bc); for relations between the Athenians and Kotys I, see Archibald 1998, 219–22;
on the background of relationships between the communities of the Chersonese and Athens,
Tzvetkova 2008, 172–83, 192–211 (and see further Ch. 5).
(^78) Stronk accepts Roy’s calculations of mercenary pay using Xenophon’sfigures atAnab.
7.7.25. Roy (1967, 320 and n.134), takes 1 Cyzicene as = 25dr.; if there were 5,250 men, then
5,250 + 1,750 = 7,000 Cyzicenes/month, which at 25dr/Cyzicene = 29.85T [Roy’sfigure], or
if 26.66dr/Cyzicene = 31.84T [Stronk’sfigure]. Both sums are close to Xenophon’s total, but
the argument is circular, since it presupposes an army whose strength has been calculated
on this basis. Xenophon is unlikely to have advertised in his memoir a sum that was less
than the amount promised atAnab. 7.2.36.
(^79) Nixon and Price 1990, 150, 152–8, and App. 166–70; Purcell 2005a.
116 Societies and economies