indication of the level of trade in other commodities along this route. The
convoy was assembled at Hieron, a harbour on the Asiatic shore at the
northern end of the Bosporus.^113 Hieron provided the principal shelter at
the entrance to the Bosporus, allowing ships passing out of the Black Sea
to wait for favourable winds for the southward passage. It was never
much more than a harbour with a sanctuary. Control of the harbour was
exercised primarily by warships, which were at this time under Athenian
control.^114 Philip not only seized the ships, but sold their cargoes—the
grain, hides or live animals, timber, and other materials—whose value
realized the eye-watering sum of 700T in cash for the Macedonian
king.^115
The incident was as significant in local terms as it was in international
perspectives. Although Philip’s success was the result of a ruse, it dem-
onstrated that the size of the Athenian navy was no longer effective in
setting the terms on which the transit trade operated through the Bos-
porus. After 340bcthe Athenians effectively ceased to be competitors for
naval supremacy of the north-east Aegean.^116 This left the commercial
control of the Bosporus almost exclusively to the Byzantines, although
the shores and channel itself continued to be a focus for occasional
military confrontations.^117 It is not easy to appreciate what this meant
in terms of shipping. There is little surviving information directly relat-
ing to the city’s naval capacity. The putative beneficiaries of the convoy
seized by Philip would have included the Athenians, Byzantines, Rho-
dians, and Chiots.^118 During the third centurybc, the Byzantines were
reluctant to get involved in inter-state encounters outside the Bosporus
and the Hellespontine Straits. Byzantine naval vessels are mentioned in
the battle of Chios against Philip V of Macedon, alongside Rhodians and
other, unnamed ships.^119
(^113) Theop.FGrH115 F292; Philoch.FGrH392 F162; Just. 9.1.1–6; Front.Strat. 1.4.13;
HMII, 576; Bresson 2000b, 132–3, 277–8; Gabrielsen 2007, 295–6; 306–7 Moreno 2008,
668 – 9; the most specific and nuanced explanation of what occurred is contained in
Didymus’Commentary on Demosthenes,11.1, cols 10.34–11.5 (= T22 in Moreno 2008,
688 – 9).
(^114) Moreno 2008, for a detailed discussion of the topography and history of the site.
(^115) Gabrielsen 2007, for detailed discussion of the sums, esp. 295–7.
(^116) Oliver 2007, 68–73, 169–71, 194–7, on Athenian naval activities in the Aegean
during the third centurybc.
(^117) Such as occurred between Antigonos I’s admiral, Nikanor, and Polyperchon’s naval
commander, Kleitos (Polyaen. 118 Strat.4.6.8 = Moreno 2008, 696, T38).
Bresson 2000b, 131–3, discusses the composition of the grainfleet of 340bc.
(^119) Dumitru (2006, 147–52, esp. 148) discusses the passage in Plb. 16.1.10, where
Byzantine vessels are included amongst the 65 enemy ships ranged against Philip V in
the battle of Chios. There may have been about 20–25, perhaps 30 Rhodian vessels
240 Regionalism and regional economies