252 martin lehnertoverlords. Monasteries became feudal for abbots and represented
their overlords’ sovereignty. As a result one can observe a decline in
absolute number, a growth of institutional range and signi cance
as well as an establishment of closer mutual relations between the
grand monasteries (Skt. mahvihra).^14 This process led to stronger ties
between kingship and clergy. The latter was requested providing sacral
legitimacy, scholarly expertise and ritual performance as means of state
protection.^15- Normativity and standards of validation: Not only for the adher-
ence to the precepts (Skt. vinaya) but also for the self-referential validity of
Buddhist teaching, terminology and methods of reasoning, the current
trends of Buddhist thought proved to be detrimental: Candrakrti’s (ca.
600–650)^16 sceptical criticism of Buddhist conceptual thought triggered
the fall of the then disintegrating laity and monastic system as norma-
tive channels of moral pragmatics; on the other hand, Dharmakrti
(ca. 600–660)^17 attempted to validate Buddhist notions by employing
standards acceptable to non-Buddhist systems of reasoning in order
to ensure the viability of Buddhist doctrines against their opponents.
In both cases the complexity of argumentation was inaccessible to the
political and military authorities potentially supportive to Buddhism.
What they observed instead was that Buddhism founded its truth claim
on mere conventions or on Brahmanic standards of validation, thereby
loosing its normative independence and value.^18
(^14) For an eighth century Chinese description of the mahvihras, see Lahiri 1995,
pp. 51–58. 15
Davidson 2002, pp. 106–111.
(^16) Candrakrti was a Buddhist logician who became famous for his commentary
Prasannapad (The Clear Worded) on the thought of Ngrjuna (cf. note 23). He advo-
cated a radical epistemologic scepticism and argued against the use of independent infer-
ences: An epistemologist’s demand for an irrefutable justi cation is already irrelevant,
since the objections he considers to be met cannot even arise if meaningful discourse
is to be possible. The requirements presupposed by epistemology are themselves the
evidence of what is the problem to be overcome. Cf. Arnold 2005, pp. 2–7. 17
Analysing crucial methodological problems of epistemology and logic, the Buddhist
philosopher Dharmakrti constructively attempted to validate Buddhist metaphysics by
formal inference. “Correct cognition” was expected to resolve the incompatibility of
concepts and rules of argumentation which separated the various philosophic tradi-
tions. In order to establish categories for what is correct and authoritative, he resorted
to perception as the ultimate basis of truth: the persuasiveness of inference still refers
to the nature of phenomena to be perceived.
(^18) Davidson 2002, pp. 100–101, 102–105.
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