of the individual contributor, but at the same time it is hoped that
the History’s standardized system of classification will enable the reader
to compare a given legal institution with relative ease across the
different systems and periods.
In the light of such variety and lack of continuity, it may well be
asked whether the ancient Near East is an appropriate forum for
this type of intellectual inquiry: whether it is a coherent subdivision
in the history of human law. Is it possible to speak of “ancient Near
Eastern law” in any meaningful sense? In my opinion it is (although
my view is not shared by all historians of the ancient Near East nor
even by all the contributors to this volume). Notwithstanding the
autonomous nature of the different systems, they demonstrate a
remarkable continuity in fundamental juridical concepts over the
course of three millennia. Without wishing to press too far more
recent historical models, such as the spread of Roman law or of the
English Common Law, I would argue that all the ancient Near
Eastern systems belonged in varying degrees to a common legal cul-
ture, one very different from any that obtains today. At the very
least, they shared a legal ontology: a way of looking at the law that
reflected their view of the world and determined the horizon of the
lawmaker.^4 The question is bound up with the fundamental issue of
the nature of the ancient legal sources.- S
In the context of a history of law, the term “source” has two mean-
ings. In an historical sense, it refers to written records from which
historians obtain evidence of legal rules and institutions. In a legal
sense, it is those norms, written or unwritten, from which the courts
drew authority for their decisions. (In modern law, the latter are
items like statutes, precedent, and treaties.) From an historical point
of view, the test of validity for a source is its credibility; from a
jurisprudential point of view, the test is its authoritativeness. It is
therefore necessary to consider the sources in turn from each of these
two viewpoints—as historical records and as legal authority.(^4) For a contrary view, distinguishing between Israel and Mesopotamia, see
Finkelstein, The Ox That Gored, 39–46.
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