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could not take a second wife at will, but needed special justification,
it may well have been that the basic condition was consent of the
first wife.5.2 Children
5.2.1 The father retained ownership of the family estate—and thus
a considerable instrument of authority—until his death, but a mother
only retained control of family assets and authority over her children
until adulthood (LH 137). The same would apply to a stepfather
if the widow remarried (LH 177). LH 172 envisages the possibility
of adult sons coercing their widowed mother to leave the family
home.5.2.2 LH 195 prescribes that if a son strikes his father, his hand
is to be cut off.5.2.3 LH 117 allows a father to sell or pledge his children to cover
a debt. On the other hand, he may not disinherit his son without
showing cause to a court (LH 168–69). Children could therefore
only be sold in cases of dire necessity.5.2.4 Lipit-Ishtar states in the prologue to his law code: “I made
the father support his children, I made the child support his father.. .”
(LL ii 16–24). No further details are supplied by any of the law
codes. Adoption contracts, on the other hand, frequently stipulate a
duty of support of the adopter by the adoptee, sometimes even spec-
ifying amounts of annual rations.^85 Presumably, they are aping a
duty of support that was regarded as too self-evident to require men-
tion in the context of the natural relationship.5.3 Adoption^86
5.3.1 Adoption was expressed by the phrase “to take for sonship/
daughtership” (ana màrùtim/màrtùtim leqûm) and was performed by the
adopter making a formal declaration: “(You are) my son/daughter!”^87(^85) Stol, “Care of the Elderly.. .,” 59–84.
(^86) David, Adoption.. .; Stone and Owen, Adoption.. .; Szlechter, “Des droits suc-
cessoraux.. .”; Westbrook, “Adoption Laws...”
(^87) See LH 170, where a man declares “my children!” (màrù'a) in order to legit-
imize children born to him by a slave concubine.
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