406
23 250). The creditor was not allowed to harvest the crop himself
in order to satisfy the debt.7.4 Distraint^144
Pledge was a consensual arrangement, even if it resulted in forfei-
ture. The ordinary creditor could not otherwise use forcible means
to satisfythe debt. He could not sell the debtor’s property without
his consent nor even seize his grain by way of direct payment (LH
113). Nonetheless, he could seize and hold members of the debtor’s
family, his slaves, and his animals. The purpose was not to satisfy
the debt but to put pressure on the debtor to pay. To these ends,
the creditor might use harsh tactics, sometimes leading to the death
of the person distrained.^145 LH 241 fines the creditor for distraining
an ox, but a letter casually mentions the distraint of three oxen (TCL
1 2:19). LH 151 bars the seizure of the debtor’s wife for his prenup-
tial debts, if her marriage contract exempted her.7.5 Debt and Social Justice^146
Valid contracts of loan, pledge, and sale could be annulled by the
courts in the interests of social justice. Three different measures were
employed.7.5.1 A pledge by its nature would be redeemed by payment of
the loan. The courts extended this principle to property sold out-
right, where the transaction was in effect a forced sale to pay offa
debt. The seller was, under certain circumstances, allowed to buy
his property at the original price. The principle applied only to fam-
ily land^147 and to family members sold as slaves.^148 It was not intended
to affect normal sale at full market price, only cases where the “price”
was in reality the amount of the loan and below the true value of(^144) Jackson and Watkins, “Distraint.. .”; Westbrook, Security for Debt.. ., 84–90.
(^145) See LH 115–16. He could force them to work (AbB 2 154:10) or imprison
them (UET 5 9 = JEOL16 (1959) 28–29; RA91, 135–45).
(^146) Westbrook, “Social Justice...”
(^147) LE 39, but only as first option when the buyer wished to resell. Sale docu-
ments sometimes carried the notation that the buyer had redeemed his paternal
estate. Under what conditions this occurred is not known.
(^148) LH 119, where a slave woman who had borne her master sons was deemed
a member of the family.
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