“Political Philosophy” and the Moralist Tradition^93
all contain a set of moral rules, either for personal improvement or for just
and effective government, mainly but not exclusively elaborating the theory of
virtues and vices, the latter being an excess or lack of the former, respectively.
Yet what differentiates the relevant part of their work from other “mirrors for
princes” (which took Nizam al-Mulk’s Siyasetname as their main model) is the
high degree of abstraction. Advice is usually given in lists: the seven virtues
for those who seek kingship, the five categories of rules for government, the
four principles concerning generosity, and so forth. We will see in chapters 3
and 4 how this obsession with lists became a typical feature of descriptions of
society and the world by members of the Ottoman bureaucracy. More particu-
larly, lists of virtues, of moral or wisdom prerequisites for good government,
etc. were to form a large part of the late sixteenth-century decline theorists,
who in this respect were, to some extent, popularizing the worldview of our
Tusian authors.61
Thus, seven virtues are required of the king: high aspirations (uluvv-i him-
met), resulting from control of his passions and lust (Kınalızade here illus-
trates the point with the example of Süleyman Çelebi, who kept indulging in
entertainment and debauchery, thus leading himself to his doom);62 solidity
of opinion; determination and resolution; forbearance; wealth (so he does
not covet his subjects’ property); fidelity from the army and its command-
ers; and a noble lineage (neseb). This last point deserves some remarks, as it
contrasts with fifteenth-century ideas as seen, for example, in the writings of
Sinan Pasha. Kınalızade explains that “in most cases” a ruler’s noble genealogy
is useful for the order of the kingdom and the loyalty of his subjects; he illus-
trates this point with the negative example of the Mamluk dynasty. He hastens
to add, of course, that the Ottoman dynasty is of noble lineage, and that the
loyalty of its soldiers and officers is beyond any doubt, as nobody would even
think of replacing the dynasty. He adds, however, that of all the virtues noted
noble lineage is not obligatory, only very useful. Amasi, on the other hand,
being much closer to an era in which the Ottomans could barely claim such a
lineage, chose to ignore his model, Tusi, and to replace this virtue of the ruler
with a fatherly attitude (übüvvet) that would make people love him (Y76).
Additionally, more “political” advice is forned of the conditions (or prereq-
uisites, şurut) that ensure a ruler’s justice. These are more directly linked to the
worldview of moral philosophy, as they embody both the circle of justice and
the four-fold division of society. A king should treat all people equally (cümle
61 For what follows, cf. Sariyannis 2011a, 124–128.
62 On this tradition and its role in the opposition to imperial projects, see Kastritsis 2007,
121–122 (and also 155–156).