“Political Philosophy” and the Moralist Tradition^95
Departing slightly from Tusi’s and Davvani’s model, Bitlisi makes a distinc-
tion between innate and acquired virtues (A18–21): God presents gifts to man
in two ways: either innate (vehbi), such as beauty, cleverness, and good for-
tune, or acquired (kesbi), such as gain through some trade. The second can be
influenced by external factors, while the first cannot. The greatest of the gifts
bestowed on man is the ordering of human affairs by divine guidance, hilafet-
i Rahmani; this may be obtained via the “visible kingship” (saltanat-ı suri),
with the “spiritual rule” (hilafet-i manevi), or with the “real caliphate” (hilafet-i
hakiki), which combines the first two. It is sustained by a series of innate bless-
ings, such as faith, good fortune, kindness in morals, good character,63 and so
forth. Bitlisi then proceeds to give pieces of advice, which vary from prerequi-
sites that will ensure kings’ eternal rule, i.e. their dwelling in Paradise (knowl-
edge of and submission to God, and benevolence: A38–40), through types of
entertainment the king must avoid, to rules concerning the collection of taxes,
the cultivation of all arable land, even with state expenses, the protection of
peasants, and so on.
What is interesting in Bitlisi’s work is his use of the concept of rules to
be followed by the sultan. Previously, when dealing with the cardinal and
the secondary virtues (A21–27), he noted that the sultan must remember the
rights of his subjects and military forces and stick to the laws ordained. And
in the longest and most practical part of his essay (A27–38), he gives many
pieces of advice (such as the need for the king’s council to be accessible to
every subject, the need for consultation with wise advisors, the tasks of the
viziers, and so on) in the form of five categories of rules (kanun). The use of
this very term is significant. Bitlisi uses it to denote law, rule, or custom,64 and,
of course, he was writing just when the culture of sultanly law or kanun was
being established. Nevertheless, in this particular case, rules were for the sul-
tan to follow, not to set. To see in Bitlisi a precursor of the seventeenth-century
exponents of a “constitutionalism” binding the sultan to religious or secu-
lar rules (see below, chapter 5) would undoubtedly be far-fetched. However,
one could return to our remark about Şeyhoğlu and other fifteenth-century
authors, who had put kingship under the condition of moral perfection and
just government rather than endowing the ruler with sacred charisma (let us
63 Here, like Amasi, Bitlisi delves into the issue of whether individual character can be
changed or not. In his opinion, human disposition is by nature mild, so everybody is in-
clined to good morals, provided he has the right guidance. It is important to note that a
king’s good or bad morals have an effect on all of his subjects.
64 Tezcan 2000, 663, fn. 9.