The Imperial Heyday 109
the acceptance of “changes through time”, which can alter even the rules of
the Sharia, show clearly the relationship of this reasoning with Islamic politi-
cal thought. It is interesting to see that the arguments of the ulema who sup-
ported Ebussu’ud stand in a kind of balanced equilibrium between the notion
of “established custom”, which was to form a paragon of political concepts (in
fact, it was already being used in the “decrees of justice” for mending oppres-
sive practices),27 and the affirmation of innovative change even in age-old
and respected aspects of the Sharia, in order to adapt them to such “estab-
lished customs”. As will be seen, Ebussu’ud’s opponents took advantage of this
ambiguous position and harshly criticized him for “innovation”.
On another level, it has been rightly argued that this “imperial”, so to speak,
trend in Hanafism was not purely state-driven, as there was a general tendency
throughout the post-medieval era among the Hanafi ulema to recognize state
authority in their legal reasoning.28 Yet one cannot neglect the relationship of
all these ulema with the state apparatus; furthermore, it may be argued that it
was precisely the emergence of law-making ex-nomadic empires that necessi-
tated this line of thought. Although dynastic claims to the caliphate continued
to be raised, it is evident that, in the circumstances, there was a need for jurists
to accept the ruler’s legal capacity if they were to form part of it.
A different aspect of the tension between kanun and the Sharia was high-
lighted by Baki Tezcan, who argued that, in the process leading from a most-
ly feudal economy (such as prevailed until the mid-sixteenth century) to an
increasingly monetarized one, kanun represented feudal law whereas the jurists’
law (which arguably took over throughout the seventeenth century) was made
by and for the interests of the emerging urban markets.29 Though I generally
adhere to his view of the socio-political transformation of the Ottoman Empire,
Tezcan relies primarily on the example of cash-vakfs. Still, those ulema who
argued in favor of this arrangement, fit for a monetary economy, also support-
ed the legal justification of miri land, a paragon of Ottoman feudalism, which,
significantly, was closely linked to the timar system and began to disintegrate
because of monetarization and tax-farming.30 One might talk here of a slight
27 İnalcık 1965; Sariyannis 2011a, 142.
28 See Burak 2013 (for a view that places emphasis on the dynastic actor); Ayoub 2016 (for a
more ulema-centered view).
29 Tezcan 2010a, 19–45.
30 Tezcan tries to reconcile this contradiction by arguing that Ebussu’ud attempted to “bring
the feudal customs ... in line with jurists’ law” (Tezcan 2010a, 43); I believe that it was vice-
versa, at least from the jurists’ own point of view. On the other hand, Ebussu’ud’s opinion
of vakfs could also be used in favor of endowing property rather than using it for increas-
ing one’s personal wealth: see an example in Gel 2013b.