“Mirrors for Princes”: The Decline Theorists^145
of Tabriz in 1585 and the subjugation of Georgia two years later, led to further
expansion of the Ottoman state eastwards with the treaty of 1590, which con-
firmed the conquest of the Caucasus, Kurdistan, and Azerbaijan. However, this
expansion was only achieved at great cost, as both the state finances and the
peasants were overburdened by the requirements of constant warfare.
In addition, almost as soon as peace with Iran had been concluded, another
long war began, in 1593, this time on the Habsburg front. Serious defeats
in Hungary and Wallachia proved that the era of uncontested Ottoman
superiority had passed. After Murad’s death, his son Mehmed III (r. 1595–1603)
famously expelled his father’s buffoons and dwarves from the palace, since
they allegedly influenced the sultan’s decisions,3 and in 1596 he led the army
in person against the Austrians. Mehmed did indeed (almost by mistake) win
a major battle in Mező-Keresztes (Hacova), although his cavalry had fled the
field (with far-reaching consequences, as will be seen). The Ottomans, how-
ever, could not take advantage of this victory and the war continued, with
mixed results, until 1606. Meanwhile, a counter-attack by Shah Abbas I, begin-
ning in 1603, cost the Ottomans Tabriz, Erevan, and Shirvan, making up for all
the losses the Safavids had suffered during the previous war.
The usual emphasis on all things military notwithstanding, what mainly
appeared to both contemporary and modern observers as a sign of decline
was the internal situation of the empire. Janissary and sipahi rebellions, which
were to form a recurrent feature of the following century, were first seen in
1589 with the “Beylerbey incident”, when Istanbul janissaries revolted in pro-
test over being paid with debased coins; monetary problems were especial-
ly acute in this period and played a major role in its perception as an age of
disorder.4 What seemed more important at the time, however, was the famous
Celali rebellions.5 Although they may be said to have been preceded by the
“student (softa, suhte) revolts” of the 1570s and 1580s (when armed bands of
provincial students roamed the countryside), Ottoman chroniclers consid-
ered the battle of Mező-Keresztes as their beginning: when, after the victory,
the Ottoman commander ordered an inspection of the cavalry left in the
field, he discovered that a large number of sipahis were missing, and accord-
ingly deprived them of their timars. The now-dispossessed soldiers returned
3 On these categories of courtiers, cf. Dikici 2006 and Dikici 2013; see, in particular, Dikici 2006,
76ff. on the representation of dwarfs and mutes as the source of all evil by late sixteenth-
century historians and political writers. The discussions on the advisors and favorites of
the sultan partly reflect the struggle for control of information in decision-making; see
Peksevgen 2004.
4 See Kafadar 1986 (esp. 76–80 on the Beylerbey incident); Kafadar 1991.
5 Barkey 1994; Özel 2012.