“Mirrors for Princes”: The Decline Theorists^153
More generally, there is an evident distrust of viziers throughout Hırzü’l-
mülûk: the author speaks explicitly against granting (temlik) 40 or 50 villages
to a grand vizier, as he has no need of such large property. After describing in
detail how viziers manipulate such grants and use them to enrich themselves,
the author remarks that the aim of conquest is to enrich the public treasury,
not that of the viziers. Ideally, no temliks should be granted at all, but if they
must be, they should not exceed one or two villages. In conclusion, the sul-
tan should elect as viziers people with few or no children and relatives; lands
granted to them should also be situated in the inner Anatolian provinces, not
on the fertile coastline (Y177–79, A37–40).
Thus, we enter into the land problem, or rather into discussions about the
disrupted structure of the timariot system. The army needs fiefs (dirlik) accord-
ing to the soldiers’ needs, yet while this arrangement requires that most of the
towns and villages belong to the state as fiefs (havass-ı hümayun ve ze’amet
ve timarlar olmak lâzım iken), most of them were private property (mülk) or
belonged to vakfs. Of course, the sultan himself had every right to endow his
own vakfs with lands he conquered, and he should administer very carefully
the granting of properties for pious endowments in order not to waste state
lands (Y176–177, A37). Such distrust for vakfs is also evident in Kitâbu mesâlih,
which often points out that if the grand vizier were to follow the measures
being proposed he would do better than creating new charitable foundations
(imaret) and spend less (e.g. Y107). As well as vakfs, the author of Hırzü’l-mülûk
also laments the disruption of the timariot system: he notes that vacant fiefs
ought not to be annexed to other timars but instead distributed to sipahis’
sons or lawful applicants. Their size must not surpass certain limits, which he
gives accordingly. Following this, and inaugurating a long tradition, he notes
that strangers (ecnebi) have acquired fiefs, while sipahis’ sons remain destitute
since they are too poor to bribe the beylerbeyis. This may be the first reference
to the intrusion of “strangers” into the military ranks, although the emphasis
is on the sipahis rather than the janissaries (as would be the case in later trea-
tises). Beylerbeyis, in turn, claim that they act thus because they are obliged
to send huge sums of money to the grand vizier, so they have to accept bribes
in order to provide this money. Indeed, all officers have to send two-thirds of
their income to the grand vizier. The only solution is for the sultan to elect
personally the beylerbeyis, regardless of the opinion of the grand vizier. After
all, “the pleasure of kingly power is equity and giving” (saltanatun lezzeti dâd
u dihiş iledir); if the sultan accepts unquestionably the appointments made by
the grand vizier, the appointees will owe their posts to the latter and behave
accordingly (Y185–89, A46–50).
Like Lütfi Pasha, the author of Hirzü’l-mülûk has little to say on the peas-
ants themselves. In fact, he says almost nothing except for the usual eulogy on