“Mirrors for Princes”: The Decline Theorists^163
Ali appears, at first glance, to be nearer the absolutist tendencies of this sultan
than he pretended to be. He notes that sultans must now rely on viziers as it
is impossible for them to inspect their army and lands themselves. However,
in this matter [of unqualified persons appointed to high posts] ignorance
is by no means an excuse; unawareness of the situation of the viziers
(vükela) will not count as a valid defense on the Day of Judgment.The present sultan, like his predecessors, prefers isolation to mixing with
the people and has delegated all power to untrustworthy administrators,
even though it is his duty to protect his subjects against these administra-
tors’ oppression (T1:18–23/91–98, and ff.). Similar observations can be seen in
Mevâidü’n-nefâis: “neither permission nor allowance is authorized for deputiz-
ing someone else in [the ruler’s] place”, he writes, adding that the system of
appointing a vizier as a “virtual monarch” (padişah-i manevi) leads to dis-
order in public affairs (B82). Again, the seclusion of the sultan contributes
to his isolation from his subjects. Earlier rulers used to take their meals
together with their children, viziers, and companions; this custom stopped
in the reign of Selim I.35 Ali criticizes this new practice of seclusion with the
verse: Haughtiness does not suit a king whom I love (B92–95). Yet this empha-
sis on the sultans’ personal responsibility may be seen as nothing more than
a way to blame them, and particularly to blame Murad III, for all shortcom-
ings of the age. When describing the “events”, meaning the perturbations
introduced by Murad, in his Künhü’l-ahbâr, he criticizes him for something
that earlier authors would have praised, namely his absolutist grasping of the
reins of power. He accepted and read petitions of grievance himself, and he
began controlling himself all appointments, which earlier had been regulated
by vizierial rescripts; this, according to Ali, meant that all issues were influ-
enced by the sultan’s boon companions rather than experienced viziers and
counsellors (Ç2:241–243).36
In addition, for Ali kingship does not necessarily have a charismatic power
and it is always possible that a dynasty will fall if it fails to impose justice. Also
in Mevâidü’n-nefâis, a special chapter (B43–46) is devoted to the behavior of
35 On this practice cf. Peirce 1993, 174; Ali – Brookes 2003, 93, fn. 585. See also Peksevgen
2004 on how such discussions reflected various views on the control of information and
secrecy.
36 Cf. Fleischer 1986a, 295. I cannot agree with Fleischer that Ali supports the “indivisible
authority” of the sultan (Fleischer 1986a, 301–302); rather, he stresses that a large part of
his power should be delegated to his grand vizier, who ought to be chosen carefully and
checked regularly.