A History of Ottoman Political Thought Up to the Early Nineteenth Century

(Ben Green) #1

194 chapter 5


notably Murad III, whose series of dreams and visions reveal that he believed
in his own special, almost prophetic mission.11 It appears that Ahmed I also
tried to impose a similar image during his reign (it will be remembered that
he denied the “old law” in 1606). His court historian (and royal imam), Mustafa
Safi, endowed him with an almost supernatural aura,12 while the building of
his mosque in Istanbul (the Blue Mosque) in defiance of ulema and other
forces in the court, and especially the closing of its central dome in 1617, was
celebrated with unprecedented pomp, even having the unusual honor of being
described in a specially-commissioned text.13 Moreover, Gencîne-i adâlet (“The
treasure of justice”), an adaptation of Hamadani’s Zakhîrat al-mulûk (cf. above,
chapter 3) that was dedicated to Ahmed I, not only equated the sultanate with
the caliphate but also considered the caliph to be the shadow of God upon
the earth (rather than the successor of the Prophet) and, most importantly,
endowed him with prophetic power.14
All these self-glorifying efforts notwithstanding, however, the sacred charac-
ter of the sultan seems to have had no appeal (even by the last decades of the
sixteenth century; Selaniki’s or Beyani’s assessments of Murad III attest to this)
for either authors of political tracts (even those from the sultans’ entourage,
such as Koçi Bey) or the major political actors in the capital, the ulema and
the janissaries. From the late sixteenth century onwards (and especially after


11 Felek 2012; Murad III – Felek 2014. Cf. Hagen 2013, 455, who maintains (contrary to what
I claim here) that “such claims, however covert, speak to a tendency towards extreme sa-
cralisation of the persona of the sultan, by means of which Ottoman rule acquired univer-
sal and thus apocalyptic significance. We may assume that in the late sixteenth century
Ottoman legitimacy no longer directly rested on justice in government and victory in war;
rather, both had become secondary results of the sultan’s sacred status granted by divine
favor alone and therefore not in need of worldly justification”. I suggest that such claims
on the part of the sultans and their court notwithstanding, there was no such sacralisa-
tion in the public discourse by the last quarter of the sixteenth century.
12 Murphey 2005.
13 Rüstem 2016. It is worth quoting Ahmed’s description in the introductory section: “that
king of kings of the world, that heroic vanquisher of mortals, that protector of Muslims
and monotheists and slayer of pagans and heretics, that possessor of wise viziers and
benefactor of army-holding commanders, that patron of scholars and luminaries and
succor of the righteous and the needy, that favorer of the most blessed lords of mankind
[the descendants of the Prophet], the Shadow of God and the caliph of the world and of
the age, by which I mean Sultan Ahmed Khan, son of Sultan Mehmed Khan, may God
Almighty eternize his rule and perpetuate his sultanate till the revolutions [of the ages]
cease and time ends, if God the All-Merciful thus wills” (ibid., 335).
14 Tezcan 2010a, 128–129. On the implications of the title “shadow of God” in Ali’s less glorify-
ing view, see Fleischer 1986a, 280–283.

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