210 chapter 5
should not be more than four in the first telhis and in Aziz Efendi (the same
idea was implied in the anonymous Hirzü’l-mülûk, where the viziers are lik-
ened to the first four caliphs), and that the defterdar should not be one of them
in Aziz Efendi and in the second telhis; that the coinage should be standard-
ized in the earlier Kitâbu mesâlih and in the first telhis; the case against some
specific types of ostentation, such as silver swords, in the first telhis and in Koçi
Bey (A25);38 the need for all assignments to be recorded, in Hırzü’l-mülûk and
in the third telhis; and so on. The dominant element holding together the ad-
vice contained in all these texts, however, concerns the army-cum-landholding
system. All authors stress that the number of salaried soldiers, either janissar-
ies (infantry) or cavalry, had swollen from the late sixteenth century onwards,
and that, conversely, the timariot cavalry had decayed due to the misallocation
of the fiefs. Thus, they propose a two-fold reform that would secure the timar
revenues and the proper distribution of the timars on the one hand, and check
the ranks of the janissaries with a view to drastically reducing their number
on the other. In practice, they all seem to agree that the reorganization of the
timar system should happen first and that distribution of the land as military
fiefs is the most profitable way of landholding.39
Furthermore, they propose very practical and political ways to gradually
bring this reform into effect. Kitâb-ı müstetâb somewhat traditionally suggests
that the sultan must find and appoint as grand vizier a God-fearing, pious
Muslim who will follow the path of justice as his predecessors did, and who will
deal with the malfunctions described. In so doing, all other improvements will
inevitably follow (Y31–35, A630–41). The other texts, however, are much more
precise and practical in their solutions. Koçi Bey remarks that the janissaries
cannot be regulated by advice: even if they took all their salaries in advance,
even if the treasury covered all their needs, even if the ulema and sheikhs
spoke to them against rebellion, they could not be disciplined; like mankind
in general, they can be controlled only through subjugation, not clemency
(A51; Ç67: beni adem kahrile zabtolunur, hilmile olmaz).40 Past sultans used the
standing cavalry (altı bölük) to control the janissaries and vice versa, while the
timariot army was used to control those two kul groups together. Now, it is
written, the timariots have decayed and the kul disproportionately grown. The
38 Koçi Bey’s attack on ostentation and excessive pageantry does not mention the concept
of someone transgressing their “limits” or hadd, as later authors would do (cf. Sariyannis
2011a, 140–141).
39 On this idea and its precedents and parallels see Murphey 2009a, 134, fn. 19.
40 As was also seen in chapter 2 above, previous political authors had elevated clemency to
being one of the highest virtues for a king, even though it is not one of the four cardinal
virtues. Cf. Sariyannis 2011a, 143.