The “Golden Age” as a Political Agenda 211
solution, therefore, is simple: the timariot army must be looked after and in-
creased, while the salaried janissaries must be decreased: the army should be
few in number and high in quality. The first step, thus, is to inspect those unas-
signed timars held by the powerful in order to redistribute them. This cannot
be done in Istanbul, as it will result only in further injustice and favors. Instead,
the governor of each province must make the inspections in situ, since at this
local level the sipahis, their sons, and the usurpers would be widely known.
In addition, villages from among the imperial hass could be granted as timars
to salaried troops in place of cash; thus, not only would this money stay in
the treasury, but the janissary class would also lose power. All private (temlik)
and vakf villages should be inspected. Those that do not comply with the legal
requirements must be given as timars to janissaries, transforming them into
timariots. Koçi Bey estimates that the salaries of 40,000 to 50,000 janissaries
might thus be saved for the treasury (A55–56; Ç71–73). He gives similar ad-
vice in various other parts of his essay (e.g. A59–60, 65–67; Ç77–78, 83–86) and
concludes that goodness and prosperity can only be gained if the reforms pro-
posed are implemented; that is, if bribery is abolished, if posts and offices are
given to worthy people and for a long time, and if the timar system exclusively
serves the sipahi army. The same methods, more or less, are suggested in the
Veliyuddin memoranda, which also emphasize long appointments, suggesting
(as in the third telhis) that all assignments must be recorded, their duration
kept reasonable, and their number frozen. What is even more practical is that
they propose specific drafts of imperial edicts in order to enhance the timariot
army at the expense of the janissaries (the fifth, six, and seventh telhis): these
would be orders to the Rumeli and Anadolu timariots securing their revenues
and describing how the timars should be inspected and the legitimacy of their
holders checked. The second order, moreover, proposes a gradual rather than
an abrupt means of taking these measures, so that a strong force would be
gradually assembled in order to secure the implementation of the reform as a
whole against the expected negative reactions. Finally, in Aziz Efendi’s work,
this last policy reaches its perfection, as he presents a detailed road-map for
the sultan, laying down drafts for imperial prescripts (and urging the sultan
to keep the content of his treatise secret so he may proceed swiftly to take the
measures proposed: M22–24). After a careful inspection of the fiefs available
for reassignment, the sultan should summon some of the provincial governors
to the capital with their forces. Then, he must summon the janissary com-
mander and other officers, as “shareholder[s] in the fate of this noble state”
(M8: bu devlet-i aliyyeden hıssedâr), and declare to them that he has decided
to reduce the number of viziers to four, to reassign misappropriated military
fiefs, and to chase out low-origin intruders in the palace. After this, he must