The “Golden Age” as a Political Agenda 217
intruders,54 the dangers of bribery, the need for discipline, and the prohibition
against janissaries following a trade.55
What is interesting in this treatise, and which differentiates it somewhat
from others of its genre, is the emphasis the author gives to the history of janis-
sary institutions, since he presents them as dynamic and undergoing many
changes over time. He usually finds recent innovations devastating, but there
are exceptions (such as when he mentions that “it used to be a rule that janis-
saries do not marry”, A154, 157; elsewhere, he specifies that they should not
marry while young and without the sultan’s permission, A173). He enumerates
those innovations in the corps that are contrary to the (old) law and those that
are not (kanuna muhalif olan bid’atlar ... ve kanun üzere olanlar: A263–268).
Moreover, the author often explains the reason for various arrangements, as
if justification by “the old law” was not yet sufficient.56 On the other hand, he
constantly keeps note of innovations that, in one way or another, harm the
quality of the corps and the public treasury. The law, significantly, was formu-
lated after consultation with judges, ulemas, and “the pillars of the state” (A169:
erkân-ı devlet), or just the ocak ağaları (A215; cf. A136, A142), and consequently
must be followed even if they are contrary to a particular sultan’s will. No less
than Selim I, on one occasion, refused to listen to his vizier, Piri Pasha (A143:
“are you to teach me the law?”, kanunu bana sen mi öğredirsin), and recruited
boys from Trabzon, which proved to be a mistake. Thus, kanun, mostly identi-
fied with what is described as late fifteenth-century practice, is conceived as
binding even for the sultan. On the other hand, its precise aim was to keep the
janissaries under the ruler’s control: their elders (korucu) should be appointed
by the sultan, again after consultation with the grand vizier, the ulema, and the
elders of the corps (A206). The ordering of the janissaries and the sipahis, the
author notes, is the only way for the world to be ordered (A206).
It seems that the last years of Ahmed I’s reign, following the definitive defeat
of the major Celali chieftains, were seen as an opportunity to reorganize the
eastern provinces along the lines of the “classical” timar system. The internal
54 The author claims that the first innovation that should be abolished is the recruitment of
the servants of the aghas (A145: ağa çırağı): all of them are Turks and similar (Türk mürk),
and their recruitment led to the corruption of the devşirme system; the same goes for the
sons of sipahis and of other officials (A152: ferzend-i sipahi).
55 The point is that a craftsman would not campaign for a salary, as he can make as much
from his craft, and estimates that “now most [ janissaries] have become craftsmen” (A196).
56 For instance, he notes that the benefit of not recruiting Turkish boys (A138: Türk evladı) is
that, in such a case, the recruits would oppress the peasants of their villages, evade taxes,
and create confusion with the local officials; also, boys who have a craft (A139: san’at ehli
olan) would not risk for a salary and would rather stay back with their profession, while
those who have lived in Istanbul have “their eyes too open” (A139; cf. again 145, 155–56).