252 chapter 6
Distinct from the Birgivi line of interpretation of the injunction “to com-
mand right and forbid wrong” that defined the duty incumbent on all Muslims
(farz-ı ayn), the interpretation in Halveti circles was that it was a duty to be ful-
filled only by some members of the Muslim community (farz-ı kifaye), some-
thing that was further qualified by their stating of who could actually carry
it out. For example, in the Letaif, which devoted its opening chapters to the
inseparability of belief (iman), intention (niyet), and practice (amel), Sivasi ar-
gued that telling people what is right and what is wrong is the duty of preach-
ers, but it is valid only when carried out with pure intentions (p. 64). The Letaif
states that not everyone is capable of carrying out this injunction, only the ca-
liph and the possessors of power (eshab-i iktidar) who were entitled to punish
those who opposed the Sharia (p. 190). In Dürer, Sivasi argued that preachers
could not and should not try to carry out investigations (tecessüs) into the af-
fairs of governors (hükkam) and sultans. He also added that if, by fulfilling this
injunction, preachers were going to cause animosity and sedition among the
people, or if the severity of their judgment could turn people away from the
Sharia, it would be better for them to keep silent.74
Sivasi’s most vocal disciple, Abdulahad Nuri, took a less idealistic approach
in his analysis of illicit innovation. One of his arguments was that, whenever
a new custom appeared among the Muslims, the first response of the ulema
was to declare it prohibited, and then, when it became widely practised, to
reverse that position on grounds of public good (istihsan), a principle that was
particularly important in Hanafi law.75 As will be seen in chapter 7, a similarly
matter-of-fact interpretation was made by Katib Çelebi, who, in his Mîzânü’l-
hakk, argued that forcing people to abandon long-held customs and beliefs, as
did the Kadızadelis, was futile.
A slightly different analysis of commanding right emerges in the Nasihatü’l-
mülûk tergiban li-hüsn as-sülûk (“Advice to rulers in anticipation of good
ways”), which was written by the chief scribe Sarı Abdullah for Mehmed IV
in 1059 (1649)—a year after his inauguration—in order to “protect statesmen
from engaging in oppression and making mistakes”.76 In addition to his long
74 Terzioğlu 1999, 260–261.
75 Terzioğlu 1999, 265; on istihsan see also below, chapter 7.
76 It is composed of two sections. The first deals with the affairs of this world while the sec-
ond looks rather like a catechists’ manual, instructing its readers in matters of faith, wor-
ship, and the afterlife. More interestingly, it was revived in the early eighteenth century by
the very popular satirist and belle-lettrist Osmanzade Taib Ahmed. He wrote an abridged
version of it called Talhis al-nasâ’ih, which he presented to Ahmed III. Osmanzade’s
decision to resuscitate this work makes a lot of sense because, in the early eighteenth
century, being associated with Melami circles was still very much in vogue among the