Khaldunist Philosophy: Innovation Justified 293
the health of the stomach is endangered. Also in the same way, if the peasants
are oppressed, the treasury will be emptied, and if the four classes envy and
fight each other then it will be harmful for the health of the state. The human
powers described above are active and strong until the end of the age of stag-
nation, after which they gradually become enfeebled, with the result that di-
gestive problems start to appear; this coincides with other signs of old age. The
signs of old age in societies consist mainly of the pomp and pageantry (ziynet)
displayed by all classes: the notables (a ’yan ve erkân) start to extend their titles
and pageantry and then, gradually, the middle classes (evasıt-ı nas) imitate the
rulers in both clothes and luxuries. As a result, the expenses of both individu-
als and society as a whole (infirâd ve ictima ’ın masrafı) continuously increase;
this is why, explains Kâtib Çelebi in detail, the expenses of the treasury also
continuously increase, disproportionally to state income. Once this has hap-
pened, it is not easy to increase income and diminish expenses to make the
budget balance; it is even considered impossible by men of experience, unless
it is imposed by force (bir kâsirin kasrı). Until then, notes the author (and, it
must be said, in something that sounds like wishful thinking), measures for a
provisional moderation of the financial crisis would be useful.
These final observations lead Kâtib Çelebi to his conclusion (AA136–137;
G160–61), in which he presents his proposal for the way successful reforms
could proceed. There are many ways to correct things, he says, but some of
them are impossible under the current circumstances. First of all, what is
needed is a “man of the sword” (sahib-i seyf) who will “make people submit
to the right way” (halkı hakka münkad etdirir). Secondly, the notables (ayan-ı
devlet) must understand that the true sultan is God; the subjects, the treasury,
and the army are His, and if they submit to Him they will act with truth and
justice and will manage to administer state affairs effectively. Thirdly, the army
has to obey experienced officers and, under their protection, defend the state
against traitors and evil-doers, as they did in the past. Fourthly, the viziers
(vükela-yı devlet) must act in unity and harmony to reduce expenses and use
the power of the army as an instrument for conducting everyday affairs. Kâtib
Çelebi hastens to note that these prerequisites seem easy but are, in fact, quite
difficult to secure (sehl-i mümteni) since few people care for the state and for
justice, most seeking pleasure instead. As such, a strong man should be found.
In the meantime, he argues, in a second “conclusion of conclusions” (AA137–
38; G161), that it must be accepted that peasants cannot afford to contribute
anything more to the treasury. The sultan should grant one year’s income to a
trustworthy servant of his, who will promise to pay it back gradually from the
income of the years to come. This grant will give him great power, which he
will then use to gradually reduce the number of soldiers and bring in the soft