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of tradition, this was also to gain pre-eminence in the context of “reciprocity”
during late eighteenth-century debates. Müteferrika placed so much impor-
tance on this argument that he returned to it in more detail, justifying very
carefully the need for reform in terms of Holy War and of the natural superior-
ity of Muslim warriors (Ş162–169). Thus, he describes the military superiority
of the early Ottomans, when war was based on swords and hand-to-hand com-
bat rather than artillery, and concludes that the Christians were forced to con-
centrate on perfecting the order of their armies in order to resist the otherwise
irresistible Muslim armies. The main advantage of the Ottomans, according to
Müteferrika, is their courage, boldness, and commitment to the ideals of the
Holy War. Lacking these, Europeans chose to reinforce their soldiers’ armor-
ies to defend against the vehemence of their opponents. The Ottomans then
had to either make swift assaults or exhaust the enemy by occupying strategic
points and avoiding battle until he is weary and confused. Under such con-
ditions, Ottoman defeats can be explained only by specific reasons, some of
which pertain to the Ottomans themselves, namely their failure to study the
situation of the enemy and the reasons for their own decline ( fesad), others
pertaining to the infidels (their order and discipline, and their commitment to
the new order of warfare; Ş169–170).
The argument for Muslim precedence in discipline and training was not in-
vented by Müteferrika; it had been used by the author of Su’âl-i Osmânî. Here,
the Christian side observed that the Ottomans stopped observing the rules of
the Holy Law, as well as their old laws (kavanin-ı kadime). Their officers used to
be pious, valiant, and zealous, while the soldiers used neither to mix with agri-
culture and commerce nor to pillage the land. That is why the Austrians, know-
ing that they could not resist an Ottoman assault, started making trenches and
using artillery; they began to practise discipline and training, to collect books
on government (umur-ı dahiliyye), and to build warehouses. If the Ottomans
did the same, they would be invincible, because the Austrians only know how
to use guns and ignore combat with swords. Furthermore, the Austrian army
has a high degree of organization, with a hierarchy of officers controlling each
other in groups of hundreds and thousands, while every contingent has its own
uniform so that deserters may be recognized. Moreover, they use their rifles
in turn and in concert, so shooting never stops. There is no way for an undis-
ciplined army to stand against these troops, all the more so since Ottoman
ranks are filled with “Turks, Kurds, and other groups of corruption”. Discipline
and order are the basis of victory. A similar reasoning is found in Bonneval’s
first treatise: he stresses the existence of constant laws and regulations which
are printed and diffused among the population (an assessment very much
in line with Müteferrika’s printing project), as well as (unsurprisingly) the