The Eighteenth Century: the Westernizers 429
alist” reasoning. The works produced to justify Mahmud II’s first moves, like
Es’ad Efendi’s Üss-i zafer (1826), kept promoting the concept of “reciprocity”
(mukabele bi’l-misl) which necessitated the imitation of European military
progress in order to fight back against the infidel. Later on, authors such as
Ragıb Efendi or Keçecizade İzzet Molla (1785–1829) tried to advocate collective
decision-making through a consultative assembly (meclis-i şura) composed of
peers from the highest echelons of the administration that would discuss mat-
ters without the sultan being present. Furthermore, İzzet Molla proposed a
fixed salary table for all functionaries (the ulema included), claiming that the
bureaucracy should be given a new order just as the army had been. He also ar-
gued, as had Penah and Behic Efendi before him, that local production should
be encouraged in order to surpass foreign imports. As for his attitude against
imitation of the West, he again used the same arguments seen in Selimian
times (e.g. in Behic Efendi’s work), i.e. that there is no reason the Ottomans
cannot excel in terms of progress where not only the infidels, “though deprived
of divine support”, but also the mediocre men ruling Mehmed Ali’s Egypt have
succeeded. İzzet Molla thus argued that the “old world” should be arranged
into a new order (eski aleme nizam vermek), introducing a dynamic dimension
in the reform discourse that would flourish in the term “Tanzimat” (reorder-
ing) itself. On this issue, as well as in the ultimate emphasis on the sultan’s
authority, he may be seen as a precursor to the sweeping reforms of the late
1830s:101
We used to be three classes: the ulema, the administrators and scribes
(rical ü ketebe), and the janissaries (ocaklu). We were all three corrupted
as time passed; our difference from the janissaries was that we confessed
our fault and took refuge with our sultan’s forgiveness and clemency.Indeed, the concentration of power and authority in the person of the sultan
was a prerequisite for imposing such a wide reform program, and it seems in-
deed that Selim III had also initiated such a process. His lack of a strong grand
vizier and his being supported by a group of reform-minded statesmen has
been blamed for his eventual failure,102 but, on the other hand, the situation
gave him full control of the ultimate decision-making that was necessary for
the implementation of such a program.
In fact, if one is determined to find precursors to the Tanzimat reforms in
Ottoman texts and practices, we can also mention the “social engineering”
101 Quoted in Kapıcı 2013, 296.
102 See Yıldız 2008, 704–712.