446 conclusion
in order to argue for the necessity of the printing press. A strange mixed atti-
tude towards the concept of innovation is found in Kuşmani’s polemical work:
first, he is at pains to show that the alleged innovations of the Nizam-i Cedid
are not really new, since they were actually used long ago; then, he admits that
weapons and tools are generally the innovations of the infidels, who are ori-
ented toward this world, while Muslims neglect worldy affairs as transitory.
This argument must be seen in the context of the mukabele bi’l-misl concept,
i.e. that there must be a spontaneous answer to the Christian advances: in this
vein, what Kuşmani really means to say is that in order to respond effectively to
the advance of the Europeans, Muslims have to imitate their innovations even
if these are not exactly canonically licit.
3.4 World Order (nizam-i alem)
Perhaps the most important concept for Ottoman political thought was the
need to ensure world order (nizam-i alem). Yet however central it may have
been, it lacked a clear definition or perhaps even meaning; but even when it
was not defined, it is implied as the result of the making of human societies, as
described above in the section on state. Most often than not, Ottoman authors
described the threats against it without providing a description of its mean-
ing: Ali, for instance, claims that world order is disrupted by neglect of laws
and ordinances, while for Kadızade Mehmed İlmi its disruption comes from
a lack of will to impose justice, the disobedience of soldiers, and the lack of
consultation with the ulema. Modern scholars have alternatively interpreted
it as “raison d’état”, “unity of the state”, “perfect public order”, “balanced distri-
bution of prerogatives”, and so on.44 It may be deduced that elements such as
the justice of the ruler, balance between the “four pillars”, and maintaining the
hadd or limit between them, among others, were self-evident constituents of
the “world order”. In the words of Pál Fodor,45
[t]he basic features of the ‘good order of the world’ as described by the
Ottoman mirrors for princes were a just ruler conducting the affairs in
person, a functional social stratification in which the norms (kânûns) of
the early 16th century were observed, the balance between the kul and
the timariot armies as well as between spending and revenues, and con-
sequently the stable position of the tax-paying re’âyâ.44 See Hagen 2005, 56–57, fn. 7; Berkes 1964, 11; Menchinger 2014a, 163ff.; Menchinger 2017,
84–86.
45 Fodor 1986, 238.