76 chapter 2
ilmi, maksad-ı ameli); each of these two can, in turn, be divided into two types,
the serving and the served (hadim, mahdum). “Serving knowledge” or ilm-i
hadim is any knowledge, such as Islamic law, that serves an aim, i.e. ilm-i mah-
dum or the knowledge of God. In the same way, “serving acts” (amel-i hadim)
such as earning goods or improving oneself morally obey the “served act”
(amel-i mahdum), namely the right guidance of people’s affairs and looking
after the world order. Here, Bitlisi refers to “spiritual” and “exoteric” kingship,
saying that in some cases these two coincide, as with caliphs. In any case, the
world cannot be deprived of one of these two at a time. Because Muslim kings
are manifestations of divine power and knowledge, they have to gain knowl-
edge of God, i.e. ilm-i mahdum; then, the prerequisite of this knowledge, as
demonstrated above, is ilm-i hadim, i.e. the knowledge of Islamic law and other
sacred regulations. In the same way, kings must improve themselves morally,
i.e. exert the “serving act”, since they are to exercise the “served act”.
Moreover, Bitlisi states that God gave humanity the perfection of all vir-
tues and capacities (A14–15). Because of this perfection, man is the substitute
(halife) of God on earth; therefore, every perfect man can be regarded as a sub-
stitute. Furthermore, people such as holy men, prophets, imams, etc. can be
named “spiritual rulers” even if they have no armies or viziers; such a naming
is symbolic and temporary, just as is the king in the game of chess. In order
for the workings of divinity to be visible, both knowledge and power must be
manifest; these two virtues can be seen in the function of rulership, and espe-
cially in the life of the Prophet (A15–18).
At any rate, individual morality is conceived as a quality that is teachable,
rather than innate. Amasi is at pains to demonstrate that one’s morals may
change, as there are ephemeral and constant features of the soul, the former
prone to formation through education, punishment, example, and even mira-
cles (Y98ff ). Kınalızade, in turn, devotes a whole chapter (K149–154) to acquir-
ing virtues, discussing whether they come by nature or by teaching; he argues
that one is first taught the virtues, through the science of ethics, and then has
to instruct one’s nature accordingly. Similarly, there are ways (such as avoiding
bad company) in which virtues, once acquired, can be preserved by the indi-
vidual (K155–168). The teachability of virtue, as well as its composition from
the four cardinal virtues, is based on an elaborate theory about the human
soul. According to Kınalızade’s analysis, the rational soul (ruh, nefs-i natıka)
has three components, namely the “vegetable soul” or spirit of growth (nefs-i
nebati), the “animal soul” or spirit of life (nefs-i hayvani), and the “human
soul” (nefs-i insani), all with their respective “powers” or faculties (K47–94).
The human soul, he goes on, contains two powers, that of perception (kuvvet-i
müdrike), which pertains to the mind and comprises both the theoretical