A History of Ottoman Political Thought Up to the Early Nineteenth Century

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“Political Philosophy” and the Moralist Tradition^77


(kuvvet-i nazari) and the practical (kuvvet-i amelî) powers, and that of motion
(kuvvet-i muharrike), which pertains to the body and comprises the power of
sensuality or lust (kuvvet-i şehevani) and the power of wrath or passion (kuvvet-i
sebu’i, kuvvet-i gazabi). If any of these powers functions in a prudent and mod-
erate manner (hadd-i i’tidal) it becomes a virtue, while when it is used in excess
or deficiency it becomes a vice.
Thus, the four cardinal virtues are defined as the use of one specific power
in moderation:33 the theoretical power produces wisdom (hikmet); the prac-
tical, justice (‘adalet); the sensual, honesty (‘iffet); and the power of passion,
courage (şeca’at). Likewise, an excess or deficiency of such powers produc-
es various vices; only justice has no excess or deficiency, rather its contrary,
namely injustice or oppression (cevr). The below table shows this:


Soul / Human reason


Power of perception Power of motion


Theoretical power Practical power Sensual power Passion


(if moderated produce:)


Wisdom Justice Honesty Courage


Kınalızade notes here that, according to some authors, justice is the combina-
tion of the other virtues, but this has no logical sense; thus, he presents an-
other definition of virtues and vices as well, based on a tripartite division of
the soul into the angelic soul (nefs-i meleki), the soul (or faculty) of passion
(nefs-i şebu’i), and that of lust or appetite (nefs-i behimi).34 In Amasi’s version
(Y86–88), these three faculties are that of reason (nutk), which is peculiar to
humanity and can be either the theoretical (akl-ı nazari) or the practical mind
(akl-i ‘ameli), and the faculties of appetite (kuvvet-i şehevi) and passion (kuvvet-
i gazabi), which are also found in animals other than man. Moderation (i’tidal),
excess, or deficiency of the three faculties produce the same four virtues and


33 On the theory of virtues in Kınalızade see some more details in Sariyannis 2011a, 126–128.
34 In al-Ghazali’s ethical philosophy, the two latter powers are considered among man’s
vicious insticts (Laoust 1970, 217–218, 331). On Islamic theories on reason see Grunebaum
1962.

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