“Political Philosophy” and the Moralist Tradition^79
generates the virtue of honesty and, through this, generosity; thus, he even
inverts the usual scheme, where honesty is the cardinal virtue and generos-
ity the secondary. Tursun Beg, in a manner reminiscent of the opposition to
Mehmed II, gives as an example the generosity of Bayezid II in bestowing the
vakfs and mülks confiscated by his father back to their previous owners (T 22–23;
cf. also T 197–98). Finally, for Kınalızade, generosity is so important that he
proceeds to define its main components, such as beneficence, forgiveness, mu-
nificence, magnanimity, and so on; in various parts of his work (e.g. K125–133),
generosity is always examined together with the cardinal virtues, thus making
five rather than four of them.
Justice, the most important virtue of all, is subdivided into faithfulness
(sadakat), familiarity, loyalty, compassion, visiting one’s relatives, fair retribu-
tion, fidelity in friendship, justice in human relationships (hüsn-i kaza), affec-
tion, compliance with God’s rules, acquiescence to God, and piety. In Tursun’s
words, justice is necessary for the integrity of the various classes (temamet-i
tavayif-i muhtelife); for example, thieves and robbers must be suppressed.
Without justice, a balance cannot be attained, the sword cannot be good, the
word is not worthy, knowledge gives no results, and the ruler cannot be sta-
ble (T17–18). According to Aristotle, says Amasi, justice differs from the other
virtues because both its excess and lack is the same, namely oppression: if,
through an excess of justice, someone is granted more than he deserves, in
consequence someone else is oppressed. Kınalızade agrees that justice also
seems to have its excess, tyranny (zulm), and its deficiency, the acceptance
of tyranny (inzilam). Some say that both these vices are oppression (cevr), of
others or of oneself, while others accept only the former, namely tyranny, as a
vice; Kınalızade is inclined towards the first opinion (K115–123; cf. K146, where
he boldly criticizes none other than Nasir al-Din Tusi on this matter).
Amasi (Y104–107) and Kınalızade (K135) specify that justice can be of
three kinds, namely equity in distributing property or social rank (keramet
ü mertebe), justice in financial transactions, and justice in punishment. In
all three kinds, justice is defined as the proportional treatment of all parts
(tenasüb-i ri’ayet, K135); it means knowing and determining the middle way
(evsat) through being guided by the law of God (namus-ı ilahi). What is more,
justice is directly linked to the creation of political society. Both Amasi (Y104–
107) and Kınalızade (K135–139) explain that mankind, unlike animals, needs a
variety of artefacts to survive, such as clothes, weapons, and so on, all of which
cannot be produced by one man alone. Thus, the formation of societies arises
as a necessity, and man is sociable by nature (insan medeniyyün bi’t-tab’dır,
K136). But in order for justice and equality to exist (tâ ki ta ’adül ve müsavat ola),
inevitably there must be an intermediary (vasıta), and this is money, which is