- first, the recognized right of national life;
- second, justice for the refugees;
- third, innocent maritime passage;
- fourth, limits on the wasteful and destructive arms race; and
- fifth, political independence and territorial integrity for all.
This is a time not for malice, but for magnanimity; not for propaganda, but for
patience; not for vituperation, but for vision.
On the basis of peace, we offer our help to the people of the Middle East. That
land, known to every one of us since childhood as the birthplace of great religions and
learning, can flourish once again in our time. We here in the United States shall do
all in our power to help make it so.
Thank you and good morning.
SOURCE:John Woolley and Gerhard Peters, The American Presidency Project, University of California, Santa
Barbara, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?month=06&year=1967.Arab League Khartoum Summit
DOCUMENT IN CONTEXT
Israel’s overwhelming defeat of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in the June 1967 War pro-
duced a range of reactions among Arabs, including anger, humiliation, resignation, and
a determination to seek revenge. All those emotions remained on display less than three
months after the war when Arab leaders met for a summit in the Sudanese capital of
Khartoum. According to accounts of private meetings, the war had made some lead-
ers—notably Jordan’s King Hussein—more realistic than before about the necessity of
dealing with Israel as a fait accompli. Others, however, appeared more determined than
ever to insist—at least in statements to their publics—that Israel’s victory would be
reversed someday, somehow.
The leaders met from August 28 to September 2, and by all accounts, the sessions
were among the most acrimonious in the history of often-contentious Arab League
meetings. As usual during that era, attention focused on Egyptian president Gamal
Abdel Nasser, who viewed himself as the preeminent Arab leader and whose rhetoric
and military maneuverings in late May had given Israel the incentive and excuse to
initiate war on June 5. Also as usual, Nasser proved to be a skillful politician when
dealing with his colleagues. Under attack from leaders more radical than himself,
including those from Algeria and Iraq, he took a hard-line on the central question of
what to do about Israel. Nasser also offered sympathy to King Hussein, who was more
willing to deal with Israel but who needed broad Arab support because of his own
political weakness at home.
ARABS AND ISRAELIS 107