The chief product of the summit was a resolution that, on its face, appeared to voice
only unrelenting opposition to Israel in all respects. News accounts at the time, and most
historical reviews, focused on one part of one sentence in the resolution: “no peace with
Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it.” This construction is routinely
referred to as the Arabs’ “three noes” toward Israel. King Hussein, however, insisted in
his memoir that the Khartoum resolution took a more subtle stance toward Israel. He
said, and some historians agree, that the resolution did not foreclose the possibility of
using methods other than war or direct negotiations to achieve the immediate Arab goal
of regaining the territories Israel had conquered. For example, the resolution did not pre-
vent dealing with Israel through third parties, such as the United Nations or the United
States or the Soviet Union, nor did it rule out intermediate steps, such as a brokered
armistice leading to the demilitarization of the conquered territories. Some historians
have argued that the Khartoum resolution was flexible enough to permit what subse-
quently occurred—a de facto peace between Israel and the Arabs most of the time, indi-
rect negotiations through third parties, and a grudging acceptance of Israel’s existence.
The Israeli government, however, chose to emphasize the rejectionist component of
the Khartoum resolution, insisting that Arab leaders had once again refused to acknowl-
edge Israel’s legitimacy. The cabinet responded by reversing its still-secret decision of June
19 to exchange some of the lands acquired in the June war for a peace settlement. The
Knesset in late October publicly endorsed the statement that Israel “will maintain the sit-
uation fixed by the cease-fire agreements and reinforce its position by taking into account
its security and development needs.” In other words, Israel would use the conquered lands
for its own purposes. From that point forward, Israel’s position was that any peace agree-
ment would have to guarantee it “secure borders,” signifying the retention of some cap-
tured lands as a necessity for Israel’s security rather than an option open to discussion.
Following is the text of the resolution adopted on September 1, 1967, at the con-
clusion of a summit meeting of the Arab League, held in Khartoum, Sudan.DOCUMENT
Khartoum Declaration
SEPTEMBER1, 1967- The conference has affirmed the unity of Arab ranks, the unity of joint action and
the need for coordination and for the elimination of all differences. The Kings, Pres-
idents and representatives of the other Arab Heads of State at the conference have
affirmed their countries’ stand by and implementation of the Arab Solidarity Charter
which was signed at the third Arab summit conference in Casablanca.
2. The conference has agreed on the need to consolidate all efforts to eliminate
the effects of the aggression on the basis that the occupied lands are Arab lands and
that the burden of regaining these lands falls on all the Arab States.
3. The Arab Heads of State have agreed to unite their political efforts at the inter-
national and diplomatic level to eliminate the effects of the aggression and to ensure
108 ARABS AND ISRAELIS