full peace between Israel and its neighbors. Diplomatic efforts to negotiate a compro-
mise failed in the Security Council in June and in early July in the General Assem-
bly. Diplomacy took on new urgency in late October when Egypt sank an Israeli ship
and Israel responded by shelling Egyptian oil installations.
Under the leadership of Lord Caradon, Britain’s ambassador to the United
Nations, the Security Council in November arrived at a compromise that met the key
demands of the Israelis as well as the Arabs. Adopted on November 22 as Security
Council Resolution 242, it set out what came to be known as the “land-for-peace”
formula: It called on Israel to withdraw from territories it had occupied “in the recent
conflict,” and in a clear message to the Arabs, it called for states in the region to
acknowledge the sovereignty of other states and allow them to “live in peace within
secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.” The resolution
was further balanced by a call for freedom of navigation (thus meeting Israel’s demand
for the right to use the Suez Canal and other waterways) and for a “just settlement of
the refugee problem” (in recognition of Arab calls for Israeli concessions to the hun-
dreds of thousands of Palestinian Arab refugees who had fled or been forced from their
homes during the 1948 and 1967 wars).
Described by historian Avi Shlaim as “a masterpiece of deliberate British ambigu-
ity,” the resolution gave the Israelis and the Arabs enough maneuvering room for each
to claim diplomatic victory without forcing either side to do anything. Even the word-
ing of the resolution was subject to conflicting interpretations. Israel and the United
States pointedly noted that the official English-language version of the resolution called
for Israel to withdraw “from territories,” a wording that could be read as implying that
Israel was not required to withdraw from allthe territories it had captured. Arab
nations preferred the French text, which called for an Israel withdrawal from “the ter-
ritories,” language that could be interpreted as demanding a full withdrawal.
The resolution also called on the UN secretary-general to appoint a special repre-
sentative to promote a “peaceful and accepted settlement” of the Arab-Israeli dispute.
Secretary-General U Thant immediately appointed the first such representative, the
Swedish diplomat Gunnar Jarring, who visited the region later in 1967 and again in
1968 but failed to make any headway, in part because Syrian officials refused to meet
with him but primarily because the Arab nations refused to negotiate even indirectly
with Israel. Jarring also failed to meet with Palestinians, who were mentioned only
indirectly in the UN resolution as “refugees.”
Within a year of Resolution 242’s adoption, Egypt launched a low-level “war of
attrition” to sap Israel’s will for holding onto the Sinai and other captured territories.
This war involved dozens of artillery and air attacks, commando raids, and other
actions by each side, with Egypt suffering the greatest damage. Both countries accepted
a cease-fire in August 1970, and a month later, on September 28, Egyptian president
Gamal Abdel Nasser died of a heart attack.
Jarring’s efforts to mediate a peace settlement under the terms of Resolution 242
continued until early 1971, when the new Egyptian president, Anwar al-Sadat, agreed
to further negotiations under certain conditions. Among those conditions was Israel’s
withdrawal from all the lands it had captured in 1967. Nothing came of Sadat’s agree-
ment, however, because the Israeli government had decided by that point to hold on
to at least some of the lands, notably East Jerusalem. In October 1971, the United
States offered its own plan for peace talks, including an agreement for reopening the
110 ARABS AND ISRAELIS