(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of
every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of
demilitarized zones;- Requeststhe Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed
to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in
order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted set-
tlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution; - Requeststhe Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress
of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.
SOURCE: United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine, http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/
d744b47860e5c97e85256c40005d01d6/7d35e1f729df491c85256ee700686136!opendocument.The October 1973 War
DOCUMENT IN CONTEXT
After the end of the “war of attrition” between Egypt and Israel in 1970, and the fail-
ure of peace initiatives by the United Nations and the United States, Egyptian presi-
dent Anwar al-Sadat decided on a two-track policy toward Israel: probing behind the
scenes for signs of Israeli willingness to negotiate and preparing for yet another war.
Several possible openings for peace talks fell by the wayside, in each case because Egypt
or Israel proved to be unable or unwilling to make the necessary concessions.
In preparing for the option of war, Sadat in July 1972 took the unexpected step
of ousting the thousands of Soviet airmen, soldiers, and other military advisers who
had helped rebuild the Egyptian military after its shattering defeat in the 1967 war.
Moscow reportedly angered Sadat by being slow to deliver promised weapons. The
Egyptian leader, realizing that the United States ultimately would play a greater role
than Moscow in the Middle East, in part because of its influence with Israel, had main-
tained secret contacts with Washington.
Throughout 1972 and into 1973, Sadat and Syrian leader Hafiz al-Assad laid plans
for an attack on Israel. According to almost all reliable accounts, Sadat and Assad had no
expectation of destroying Israel in their attack, and instead hoped to regain some of the
territory lost in the 1967 war and to galvanize the international community into pres-
suring Israel into making concessions. Two equally important goals were to restore Arab
pride and strengthen their regimes domestically by inflicting a military setback on Israel.
Egypt and Syria launched their attack in the early afternoon of October 6, 1973,
to catch Israelis off-guard as they celebrated Yom Kippur, the Day of Atonement or
Day of Judgment, the holiest day of the year for Jews. The Arabs achieved their objec-
112 ARABS AND ISRAELIS