Tonight, on the eve of what can be a dawning of new hope for the people of the
troubled Middle East—and for all the world’s people who dream of a just and peace-
ful future—I ask you, my fellow Americans, for your support and your prayers in this
great undertaking.
Thank you, and God bless you.
SOURCE: John Woolley and Gerhard Peters, The American Presidency Project. University of California, Santa
Barbara, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=42911.The Arab League Fez Summit
DOCUMENT IN CONTEXT
With few exceptions, the periodic steps toward Middle East peace have been incremen-
tal ones involving small concessions by one side or the other. One such example came
about early in September 1982, when Arab leaders met in Fez, Morocco, in the wake
of Israel’s invasion of Lebanon. As could be expected, the leaders harshly denounced the
invasion, which led to the expulsion of Palestinian guerrillas and leaders from Lebanon,
but at the initiative of Saudi Arabia’s King Fahd, they also for the first time put forth
the possibility of recognizing Israel as a legitimate presence in the region.
The Final Declaration of the summit issued on September 9 listed eight “princi-
ples” for Middle East peace. These included what had become the traditional Arab
demands for Israel to withdraw from all the territories it had occupied since the June
1967 war and to allow for the “self-determination” of the Palestinians. The seventh
principle departed from the standard rhetoric in calling for “the establishment by the
United Nations Security Council of guarantees of peace between all States of the
region, including the independent Palestinian State.” The reference to “all States”
implicitly includes Israel, which none of the Arab leaders present had been willing to
recognize officially. At the time, only Egypt had signed a peace treaty with Israel, and
it had been expelled from the Arab League for doing so.
Despite this noteworthy change in position, the Arab declaration included two
caveats that made it unacceptable to Israel. One was a reference to the UN Security
Council implying that any peace negotiations should take place under UN auspices,
which Israel opposed because of its distrust of the organization. The other was a ref-
erence to an “independent Palestinian State,” something that the Israeli government
at the time adamantly opposed and said it would never allow.
Another notable aspect of this declaration was that it limited the maneuvering room
of Jordan’s King Hussein. The declaration referred to the Palestine Liberation Organi-
zation (PLO) as the “sole and legitimate representative” of the Palestinians. Hussein had
accepted that role for the PLO in 1974, but in 1982 he still claimed sovereignty over
136 ARABS AND ISRAELIS