The mix of tactics advocated in this and other communiqués reflects, in part, dif-
ferent approaches among the Palestinian factions. In addition to the Unified Com-
mand’s leaflets, individual factions and for a time Hamas (formed in December 1987
after the intifada had began) disseminated their own, competing communiqués.
Although Hamas did not agree with the Unified Command’s program of nonviolence,
it cooperated with the uprising’s leadership. Regardless of the source, many of the
intifada’s leaflets dealt with long-term political issues, such as demands for Israel’s with-
drawal from the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the release of prisoners held by the
Israelis.
Although most of the early communiqués stressed nonviolent resistance—such as
strikes and nonpayment of taxes and fines—the emotion-laden atmosphere often
resulted in violence, in part because the stepped-up presence of Israeli soldiers created
flashpoints for confrontation. The Palestinians purposely avoided the use of guns
against the Israelis. Instead youths confronted Israeli soldiers primarily with stones;
some occasionally used knives, broken glass, and Molotov cocktails in attacks on secu-
rity forces and civilians in the occupied territories. According to the Israeli military,
from December 1987 through 1991 only twelve of its soldiers died as a result of con-
frontations with Palestinians.
The outbreak of the intifada caught the Israeli government off-guard. Despite
some Israeli assertions to the contrary, the uprising clearly represented the release of
pent-up grievances after two decades of military occupation, including humiliating
treatment of Palestinians by Israelis on a daily basis. Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin
adopted a hard-line approach and was reported to have told his troops to “break their
[Palestinian] bones,” a statement Rabin later denied having made. In a speech to the
Knesset on December 23, Rabin said the Palestinians’ actions “will achieve noth-
ing.... Here we will fight united in all our strength—and it is substantial—against
any element that attempts through violence to undermine our complete rule in Judea,
Samaria [Israeli terms for the West Bank] and the Gaza District.”
International media coverage of Israel’s harsh suppression of the intifada led to
widespread outrage, even among traditional supporters of Israel in the United States
and other Western countries. The UN Security Council on December 22, 1987,
adopted Resolution 605, the first of several resolutions condemning the crackdown.
The United States, which often vetoed resolutions critical of Israel, supported this one.
The intifada led the administration of President Ronald Reagan, which had gener-
ally avoided involvement in the Middle East following its disastrous experience in
Lebanon in 1983, to mount a new peace initiative in March 1988. As outlined by Sec-
retary of State George Shultz, it called for an international conference leading to nego-
tiations toward self-rule by the Palestinians. The administration quickly dropped the
initiative, however, in the face of reluctance by the PLO and adamant opposition by
Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Shamir (U.S. Involvement in Lebanon, p. 339).
The intifada raged for more than three years before sputtering out during 1991
for a variety of reasons, including inadequate leadership by the PLO and the frustra-
tion of many Palestinians who lost their jobs, and even their family members, with-
out any concrete gains. Although Israeli-Palestinian violence continued during the
1990s, the intifada itself ended in 1993, the year that Israel and the PLO signed a
landmark peace agreement. B’Tselem, an Israeli human rights group, tallied deaths
during the intifada as 1,067 Palestinians killed by Israeli security forces; 54 Israeli sol-
192 ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS