to be Clinton’s last day at the summit because he needed to campaign for midterm con-
gressional elections—the ailing King Hussein of Jordan paid a visit and appealed to the
leaders to reach agreement. Noting that each side had been emphasizing its own needs,
he said, “These differences pale in comparison to what is at stake. After agreement both
sides will look back and not even recall these issues. It is now time to finish, bearing in
mind the responsibility that both leaders have to their people and especially the chil-
dren.” (The king had been undergoing treatment for cancer at the Mayo Clinic in Min-
nesota, and everyone at the summit knew he did not have much time to live; he died
four months later). Hussein’s dramatic plea did not, in itself, force the leaders to agree,
but it put more pressure on Arafat and Netanyahu to negotiate compromises.
An all-night negotiating session ultimately produced an agreement, but not before
one last crisis. After a deal had been reached, Netanyahu insisted that he could not
accept it unless Clinton agreed to release Jonathon Pollard, a former U.S. Navy intel-
ligence analyst serving a life sentence in prison following his conviction on charges of
passing highly classified information to Israel. Pollard’s case had become a major cause
célèbre among right-wing Israelis, and Netanyahu wanted to secure his release to pro-
vide political cover for the modest concessions he had made to Arafat. Clinton rebuffed
Netanyahu, promising only to “review” Pollard’s case.
As signed at the White House on October 23—the conclusion of the ninth day of
negotiations—the agreement required Israel to turn over to the Palestinians an additional
13 percent of the West Bank over a three-month period in three stages. All but 1 percent
of this additional land was to remain under Israeli security control, however. Arafat prom-
ised a “work plan” to combat terrorism, including accepting assistance from the CIA in
arresting Hamas and Islamic Jihad fighters. Arafat also pledged to call a session of the Pales-
tine National Council to delete anti-Israel clauses from the 1968 national covenant. The
two sides agreed to the immediate opening of negotiations on a permanent settlement of
all outstanding issues, with the goal of achieving a final agreement by May 4, 1999.
Netanyahu delayed presenting the Wye River Memorandum to his cabinet for
nearly three weeks, during which time right-wing opposition to the accord mounted
and Netanyahu found himself on the defensive. The cabinet approved the agreement
on November 11 by a narrow vote after an angry debate; the Knesset approved it by
a much wider margin, representing broad support among the Israeli public for keep-
ing the peace process intact. On November 20 Netanyahu carried out most of the first
stage of the promises he had made at Wye River; his government turned over some 9
percent of the West Bank to full or partial Palestinian control, released about 250
Palestinian prisoners, and allowed the partial reopening of the airport in Gaza.
A month later, insisting that the Palestinians had not fulfilled their part of the agree-
ment, Netanyahu’s government announced the indefinite “suspension” of the Wye
River Memorandum. This step amounted to Netanyahu’s admission that he was
hemmed in by a lack of public support for his policy of stalling on the Oslo peace pro-
cess and stymied by the resistance of his right-wing supporters from moving forward
with permanent peace talks. His government fell the next day; the Knesset called new
elections for May 1999. Netanyahu lost the elections to the new Labor Party leader,
Ehud Barak, an Israeli military hero who previously had served as army chief of staff
and had since become a staunch advocate of securing peace with the Palestinians.
For his part, Arafat carried out several of the major provisions of the Wye agree-
ment, including a limited crackdown on Hamas and Islamic Jihad. On December 14,
268 ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS