Hamas’s leaders rejected the Quartet’s demands and on March 20 published their
official program for the new government. Although milder in language than traditional
Hamas statements, the twelve-point document made none of the concessions demanded
by the Quartet. The fourth point of the program explicitly rejected the Quartet’s
demand for nonviolence, stating that “resistance in its various forms is a legitimate right
of the Palestinian people to end the occupation and regain the national rights.”
The new Hamas-led government took office on March 29, but because of travel
restrictions imposed by Israel, some legislators gathered at the Palestinian Authority
headquarters in Ramallah, on the West Bank, while others convened at the authority’s
office in Gaza City; they communicated by video link. Hamas had chosen Ismail
Haniyeh, considered one of the group’s moderate leaders, as prime minister.
The Quartet issued a statement the next day, March 30, expressing “grave con-
cern” that the Hamas government had not met the conditions of its January 30 dec-
laration and warning that “there inevitably will be an effect on direct assistance” to
the Palestinian government. Responding to this statement, and even stronger warnings
from Washington, the new Palestinian foreign minister, long-time Hamas official Mah-
moud Zahar, on April 4 sent UN secretary-general Kofi Annan a mildly worded let-
ter appealing for international support of the new government. Noting that Hamas
had won internationally recognized elections, Zahar wrote, “We also hope that certain
States will re-examine the premature stands and hasty decisions they have taken, espe-
cially with regard to withholding assistance and adopting a language of threats rather
than dialogue.” Despite this appeal, the European Union and the United States in sub-
sequent weeks announced the suspension of their direct aid to the Palestinian gov-
ernment, but continued deliveries of food, medicine, and other forms of humanitar-
ian aid that bypassed the government.
The installation of the Hamas-led government made the Palestinian Authority a
two-headed institution: Abbas continued as president, with little direct administrative
control but authority over several of the security services established under Arafat, while
Haniyeh and other Hamas-appointed cabinet officials headed the executive agencies
charged with carrying out the daily affairs of the government. Despite pledges of coop-
eration by both sides, the inherent conflicts in the arrangement soon came to the fore,
exacerbated by economic deterioration because of the loss of most of the government’s
international aid. The Palestinian Authority, by far the biggest employer in the terri-
tories, paid the salaries of tens of thousands of teachers, administrators, and policemen
with guns who suddenly faced the loss of their paychecks.
Over the next several months, leaders from Fatah and Hamas worked to devise a
formula for a “national unity” government that would preserve the Hamas electoral
victory but also meet the Quartet’s conditions for resumption of international aid. For
a few weeks, the most promising of these efforts appeared to be a “national concilia-
tion document” composed by leading Fatah and Hamas members in Israeli prisons.
Negotiations between the factions based on this prisoners’ document ultimately failed,
however. Subsequent negotiations produced another agreement in September that also
called for a national unity government. A key point of that accord called on the Pales-
tinian Authority to respect the peace agreements that the PLO had signed with Israel;
this provision might have met one of the demands of the Quartet. Hamas leaders later
backed away from the document, and several additional attempts to negotiate an
accord between Fatah and Hamas also failed.
ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS 319