Second, when the Government of Lebanon is able to reconstitute itself into a
broadly based representative government, we will vigorously accelerate the training,
equipping, and support of the Lebanese Armed Forces, on whom the primary respon-
sibility rests for maintaining stability in Lebanon. We will speed up delivery of equip-
ment; we will improve the flow of information to help counter hostile bombardments;
and we will intensify training in counter-terrorism to help the Lebanese confront the
terrorist threat that poses such a danger to Lebanon, to Americans in Lebanon, and
indeed to peace in the Middle East.
Third, in conjunction with these steps, I have asked Secretary of Defense [Casper]
Weinberger to present to me a plan for redeployment of the marines from Beirut Air-
port to their ships offshore. This redeployment will begin shortly and will proceed in
stages. U.S. military personnel will remain on the ground in Lebanon for training and
equipping the Lebanese Army and protecting the remaining personnel. These are tra-
ditional functions that U.S. personnel perform in many friendly countries. Our naval
and marine forces offshore will stand ready, as before, to provide support for the pro-
tection of American and other MNF personnel in Lebanon and thereby help ensure
security in the Beirut area as I have described.
These measures, I believe, will strengthen our ability to do the job we set out to
do and to sustain our efforts over the long term. They are consistent with the com-
promise joint resolution worked out last October with the Congress with respect to
our participation in the multinational force.
SOURCE:Ronald Reagan Presidential Archives, University of Texas, http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/
speeches/1984/20784d.htm.The Taif Accord
DOCUMENT IN CONTEXT
In December 1985, Syria arranged negotiations among key sectarian factions that
resulted in the Tripartite Agreement, an attempt to resolve Lebanon’s conflicts by giv-
ing increased authority to their various militias and political organizations at the
expense of the already weak central government. Signing the agreement were Elie
Hobeika, leader of the Lebanese Forces, a Phalangist-controlled Christian militia;
Walid Jumblatt, leader of the Druze community and head of the most powerful Druze
militia; and Nabih Berri, head of the Shiite group Amal. That agreement never took
full effect, and then it completely collapsed in 1986 when Phalangist leader Amin
Gemayel, also Lebanon’s president, ousted Hobeika from his post with the Lebanese
Forces. The collapse of the Tripartite Agreement led to renewed conflict, most of it
intramural in nature, with various elements of Christian and Shiite militias battling
344 LEBANON AND SYRIA