each other for dominance. Syria attempted to impose a degree of order by expanding
its military presence in Lebanon, thus increasing its overall control of it.
Another crisis erupted in September 1988, when the parliament, or Chamber of
Deputies, failed to agree on a successor to President Gemayel before the mandated end
of his second term on September 23. The parliament consisted of the same legislators
who had been elected in 1972 because there had been no elections during the civil war.
The stalemate resulting from the parliament’s failure to act led to two governments com-
peting for leadership of the country—one headed by the sitting prime minister, Selim
al-Hoss, and the other led by Michel Aoun, the commander of the Lebanese Army who
declared himself president and moved into the presidential palace outside Beirut.
This situation erupted into another round of fighting early in 1989, when Aoun
declared a “war of liberation” against Syrian occupation and also attempted to assert
control over all of Lebanon’s sectarian militias. Syria intervened on behalf of the Druze
and Muslim militias. A summer of artillery duels and ground battles almost matched
the worst of the 1975–1976 civil war violence and that of the 1982 Israeli invasion.
Hoping to mediate an end to the dispute, Saudi Arabia convened a peace confer-
ence in the Saudi resort town of Taif at the end of September 1989. Most members
of the Lebanese legislature attended. Working from a draft document prepared by the
Arab League, the delegates spent three weeks debating the political issues at the heart
of Lebanon’s civil war. On October 22, they reached agreement on a document for-
mally called the National Reconciliation Charter, popularly known as the Taif Accord.
The document, also approved by Syria, quickly won international endorsements,
including by the UN Security Council.
In essence, the Taif Accord adjusted (while preserving the basic character of) the sec-
tarian division of power in effect since adoption of the National Pact in 1943. The most
important change involved increasing the size of the Chamber of Deputies from ninety-
nine to one hundred eight seats, with the membership split equally between Christian and
Muslim representatives. The previous ratio had been six Christians to five Muslims. The
sectarian division of top government posts—a Christian president, Sunni prime minister,
and Shiite Speaker of parliament—remained in effect, though some of the president’s pow-
ers shifted to the prime minister. The accord also promised a review, at an unspecified
time, of the entire system of assigning government posts according to religious sect.
Another key element of the accord dealt with Syrian military involvement in
Lebanon. In a compromise, the accord gave Syria the role of helping the army “of the
legitimate Lebanese government” to broaden its authority over the entire country dur-
ing a two-year period. At that point, the Lebanese and Syrian governments were to
negotiate the terms for Syria to withdraw its military. The provision gave Damascus
even more legitimacy for its presence in Lebanon, although with an explicit promise
that it would, in fact, withdraw its army when asked to do so.
After returning to Lebanon, members of the parliament formally endorsed the Taif
Accord on November 5, 1989, and elected a new president, Rene Muawwad. Aoun,
however, refused to step aside and to recognize Muawwad or accept the agreement.
Muawwad was assassinated in a car bombing on November 22, and the parliament
promptly chose Elias Hrawi to succeed him. In mid-August 1990, the parliament for-
mally incorporated the Taif Accord provisions into a revised constitution. President
Hrawi signed the changes into law on September 21, brushing aside a threat by Aoun
to use military force against him. About three weeks later, on October 13, the Syrian
LEBANON AND SYRIA 345