Lebanon (UNIFIL), the small peacekeeping force that had been in place since 1978.
These points eventually became the basis of UN negotiations to end the conflict.
After several inconclusive attempts to bring about a cease-fire, the United States and
France agreed on the essence of a resolution on August 5, but objections from Lebanon
and other Arab nations held up final agreement on language until August 11. Adopted
unanimously by the Security Council, Resolution 1701 called for a “full cessation of hos-
tilities” by all sides in Lebanon. Although welcoming the resolution, Secretary-General
Kofi Annan expressed frustration at the lengthy diplomacy, telling the council that its
“inability to act sooner has badly shaken the world’s faith in its authority and integrity.”
The heart of the resolution consisted of a plan for the rapid expansion of UNIFIL,
at the time comprised of a staff of about 2,000 monitors and over the years unable to
prevent any of the numerous outbreaks of hostilities in Lebanon. Resolution 1701 called
for a new force, subsequently named UNIFIL II, with 15,000 troops and a mandate
to enforce peace in southern Lebanon. Meanwhile, Lebanon’s army would station an
equivalent number of troops in the region. Between them, these two forces were to fill
the security vacuum that Hizballah had claimed necessitated its armed presence.
The UN-mandated cease-fire went into effect, and the fighting finally ended, early on
August 14, which meant the war lasted either 33 or 34 days, depending on which days
are counted. The Lebanese government announced that 1,191 people, most of them civil-
ians, had been killed. Hizballah acknowledged the loss of 200 of its fighters, although Israel
insisted that it had killed more than 500 Hizballah members. Government and UN fig-
ures also tallied some 15,000 homes and 900 commercial buildings as being destroyed. On
the Israeli side, the government announced a death toll of 116 soldiers and 43 civilians.
Few buildings in Israel were destroyed, but the Israeli economy suffered serious damage.
In late August, the Lebanese Army began moving into the area south of the Litani
River as part of the mandate under Resolution 1701 for the Beirut government to
establish its authority over all of Lebanon’s territory. The army had not had a pres-
ence in the south for decades. Members of the new UN force began arriving in mid-
September and by the end of October had about half of its 15,000-man contingent
in place. Although Resolution 1701 called for the disarmament of all “armed groups”
in Lebanon other than the official army, it became clear that neither the Lebanese
Army nor the new UN force would force Hizballah to give up its weapons. Even so,
the presence of the army and UNIFIL II had the potential to weaken Hizballah’s mil-
itary grip on the region, at least for a while.
During the conflict, respected voices in Israel had already begun bemoaning the
results. The liberal Ha’aretz,in an August 9 editorial, characterized the war as “a sting-
ing defeat” for Israel and demanded that the country’s political leaders be held account-
able. Returning soldiers told stories of bungled military operations and surprising
shortages of such necessities as fuel and water, a deeply embarrassing situation for a
country proud of having the most powerful and efficient military in the Middle East.
The government of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, which had won elections in March,
promised an official inquiry into management of the war, but refused to name a com-
pletely independent investigation as had been done on some occasions.
The government’s management of the war raised serious questions about Olmert’s
leadership that were echoed when the official inquiry, headed by former High Court
justice Eliyahu Winograd, submitted its preliminary report on April 30, 2007. The
report faulted Olmert, Defense Minister Amir Peretz, and the military chief of staff,
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