United States (and its allies) and the Soviet Union (and its allies). During the first
years of the 1980s, tensions between Washington and Moscow in part prevented the
United Nations from taking any effective diplomatic action to bring the Iran-Iraq War
to a conclusion. Competition between the two superpowers for influence in the Per-
sian Gulf even contributed to some aspects of the war, such as the U.S. decision to
reflag Kuwaiti oil tankers in 1987 rather than allow Moscow to do so.
By mid-1987, however, several elements had come together to allow the UN Secu-
rity Council to take its first decisive stand on the war. One element concerned the
increasing threat to world oil supplies because of attacks on shipping in the Persian
Gulf. Another involved the overall easing of tension between Washington and Moscow
following reformist Mikhail Gorbachev’s rise to power as Soviet leader. It had also
become clear by 1987 that neither Iran nor Iraq would be able to muster a complete
victory in the war.
After months of negotiations, the Security Council in mid-July finally produced
a comprehensive diplomatic initiative that included elements encouraging Iran and Iraq
to end their fighting. The council adopted Resolution 598 on a unanimous vote on
July 20. It was the first time in UN history that the five permanent members of the
Security Council had voted to demand an end to an ongoing war although the com-
batants had not accepted a peace agreement. Key elements of the resolution demanded
an immediate cease-fire, the withdrawal “without delay” of military forces to interna-
tional boundaries, the exchange of prisoners of war, and the cooperation of both par-
ties in the negotiation of a “comprehensive, just and honorable settlement” of the
underlying issues. The resolution did not provide for any kind of enforcement; for
example, it did not authorize an outside party to intervene to ensure that Iran and
Iraq comply with the council’s demands. The council did, however, adopt the resolu-
tion under the chapters of the UN Charter, giving it the power to impose sanctions
against member countries, thus creating the prospect that either Iran or Iraq or both
could be subjected to an arms embargo. U.S. secretary of state George P. Shultz sug-
gested the possibility of such sanctions, stating on July 20 that Washington would
back “the decisive application of enforcement measures” if either Iran or Iraq rejected
the call for a cease-fire.
Iraq immediately accepted the UN resolution—providing that Iran do likewise.
Tehran refused, however, with its chief representative at the UN calling the measure
a “vicious American diplomatic maneuver.” UN secretary-general Javier Pérez de Cúel-
lar embarked on a series of diplomatic missions lasting through the remainder of 1987
that created modest hope but no end to the war. Even as de Cúellar negotiated with
the two sides, the Reagan administration pushed the Security Council to impose an
arms embargo against Iran because of its refusal to accept Resolution 598. China and
Russia blocked the effort.
Arab Summit
One other diplomatic initiative on the war came in late 1987 from the Arab League,
which previously had avoided taking a strong position on the conflict although one of
the combatants—Iraq—was a member of the league. After a four-day summit in
Amman, Arab leaders on November 11 took a surprisingly strong position condemn-
ing Iran for its “procrastination” in accepting Resolution 598.
IRAQ AND THE GULF WARS 433