The Contemporary Middle East. A Documentary History

DOCUMENT

Butler Letter on

UNSCOM’s Work in Iraq

JANUARY25, 1999

REPORT: DISARMAMENT

... 7. The Commission’s work has taken five main forms:

• evaluation and analysis of Iraq’s declarations;


• inspections of relevant sites in Iraq;


• interviews of Iraqi personnel connected to proscribed weapons programs;


• seeking access to and study of relevant Iraqi documentation;


• seeking assistance from Member States, particularly through the provision of rele-
  vant information, as required of them by the Security Council.

8. As has been reported to the Council, over the years, and as has been widely
   recognized, notwithstanding the very considerable obstacles placed by Iraq in the way
   of the Commission’s work, a great deal has been achieved in: verifying Iraq’s frequently
   revised declarations; accounting for its proscribed weapons capabilities; and in destroy-
   ing, removing or rendering harmless substantial portions of that capability....
   12. Three basic points about this disarmament record need to be made. First,
   the overall period of the Commission’s disarmament work must be divided into two
   parts, separated by the events following the departure from Iraq, in August 1995, of
   Lt. General Hussein Kamal. This which resulted in the provision to the Commis-
   sion of an extensive cache of documents on Iraq’s prohibited programs. These doc-
   uments and subsequent disclosures by Iraq indicated that, during the first four years
   of its activities, the Commission had been very substantially misled by Iraq both in
   terms of its understanding of Iraq’s proscribed weapons programs and the continu-
   ation of prohibited activities, even under the Commission’s monitoring. Positive
   conclusions on Iraq’s compliance reported to the Council previously by the Com-
   mission had to be revised. They were conclusions generally based on accepting Iraq’s
   declarations at face value. Analysis of the new material shaped the direction of the
   Commission’s subsequent work including the emphasis on: obtaining verifiable evi-
   dence including physical materials or documents; investigation of the successful con-
   cealment activities by Iraq; and, the thorough verification of the unilateral destruc-
   tion events.
   13. Secondly, the Commission has been obliged to undertake a degree of foren-
   sic work which was never intended to be the case. This was derived, virtually exclu-
   sively, from Iraq’s inadequate disclosures, unilateral destruction and concealment activ-
   ities. These actions, all of which were contrary to the resolutions, made the
   Commission’s work more difficult and, in many cases, continued even after 1995. Had
   this behavior not occurred, a far less searching inquiry by the Commission would have
   been necessary. The work of verification of Iraq’s declarations would have and should
   have been far easier and should have been able to be undertaken far more quickly than

480 IRAQ AND THE GULF WARS