has proven to be the case. Such concerted obstructions naturally raise the question of
why Iraq has carried out these activities.
- Thirdly, these overall circumstances have meant that, in spite of the years that
have passed and the extensive work that has been undertaken, it has not been possible
to verify, fully, Iraq’s statements with respect to the nature and magnitude of its pro-
scribed weapons programs and their current disposition. - With respect to this latter point, two comments are apposite. First, Iraq’s cur-
rent claims that; it has fulfilled all of its disarmament obligations in each weapons area;
ceased concealment policies and actions; and, that it has neither proscribed weapons
nor the ability to make them are not able to be verified. - Secondly, documents or records available in Iraq in which relevant details of
its proscribed programs and actions are set out: production and acquisition records;
records of disposition of weapons; and, records of claimed destruction, relevant policy
decisions and decisions on termination of concealment, would be invaluable in help-
ing to close remaining gaps and achieve acceptable confidence in Iraq’s declarations.
The Security Council recognized these two aspects in resolution 707 (1991) when it
demanded Iraq provide immediate and unconditional access to, inter alia,records, and,
demanded that Iraq cease attempts to conceal prohibited materials. - In response to the Commission’s requests for relevant documents, Iraq has
repeatedly claimed that they no longer exist or cannot be located, a claim which often
has been shown to be false, either because inspection activities have in fact located pre-
cisely such documents or because Iraq has reversed its stated position and then pro-
duced relevant documents. The Commission briefed the Council on its assessment of
the existence and importance of documents in June 1998. The Commission has
assessed that the documents provided in August 1995 were only selected categories of
documents provided and that other categories were retained by Iraq. It remains the
Commission’s strong view that, under the present circumstances, relevant documen-
tation exists in Iraq and that provision of such documentation is the best hope for
revealing the full picture, as required by the relevant resolutions. - On certain other occasions, Iraq has not claimed that documents sought by
the Commission do not exist but has stated instead that they are not relevant to the
Commission. The judgment of relevance of any given document is for the Commis-
sion, not Iraq, to make, as has been recognized by the Security Council. - In August 1998, Iraq declared that unless the Commission could demonstrate
that Iraq retained prohibited items, then it must declare that Iraq had fully imple-
mented its obligations under section C of resolution 687. This is contrary to the sys-
tem established by the Council which imposed upon Iraq the obligation of full dis-
closure and upon the Commission the duty to verify those disclosures. Were a reversal
of these obligations to be accepted, the possibility of serious error would be high as it
is Iraq which controls access to the most fundamental information. The Commission
remains convinced that Iraq has the capacity to provide credible information thus
allowing the Commission to have confidence in an accurate declaration, when it is
provided. - Notwithstanding the fundamental sources of difficulty described above, and
building on both its past achievements and the substantial body of knowledge of
Iraq’s proscribed programs the Commission assembled, in June of 1998, and indicated,
first to the Security Council and then to Iraq, what it believed to be the remaining
IRAQ AND THE GULF WARS 481