RECOMMENDATION 27: De-Baathification. Political reconciliation requires the
reintegration of Baathists and Arab nationalists into national life, with the leading fig-
ures of Saddam Hussein’s regime excluded. The United States should encourage the
return of qualified Iraqi professionals—Sunni or Shia, nationalist or ex-Baathist, Kurd
or Turkmen or Christian or Arab—into the government.
RECOMMENDATION 28: Oil revenue sharing. Oil revenues should accrue to the
central government and be shared on the basis of population. No formula that gives
control over revenues from future fields to the regions or gives control of oil fields to
the regions is compatible with national reconciliation.
RECOMMENDATION 29: Provincial elections. Provincial elections should be held
at the earliest possible date. Under the constitution, new provincial elections should
have been held already. They are necessary to restore representative government.
RECOMMENDATION 30: Kirkuk. Given the very dangerous situation in Kirkuk,
international arbitration is necessary to avert communal violence. Kirkuk’s mix of
Kurdish, Arab, and Turkmen populations could make it a powder keg. A referen-
dum on the future of Kirkuk (as required by the Iraqi Constitution before the end
of 2007) would be explosive and should be delayed. This issue should be placed on
the agenda of the International Iraq Support Group as part of the New Diplomatic
Offensive.
RECOMMENDATION 31: Amnesty. Amnesty proposals must be far-reaching. Any
successful effort at national reconciliation must involve those in the government find-
ing ways and means to reconcile with former bitter enemies.
RECOMMENDATION 32: Minorities. The rights of women and the rights of all
minority communities in Iraq, including Turkmen, Chaldeans, Assyrians, Yazidis,
Sabeans, and Armenians, must be protected.
RECOMMENDATION 33: Civil society. The Iraqi government should stop using
the process of registering nongovernmental organizations as a tool for politicizing or
stopping their activities. Registration should be solely an administrative act, not an
occasion for government censorship and interference.
Steps for the United States to Take on Behalf of National ReconciliationThe United States can take several steps to assist in Iraq’s reconciliation process.
The presence of U.S. forces in Iraq is a key topic of interest in a national recon-
ciliation dialogue. The point is not for the United States to set timetables or deadlines
for withdrawal, an approach that we oppose. The point is for the United States and
Iraq to make clear their shared interest in the orderly departure of U.S. forces as Iraqi
forces take on the security mission. A successful national reconciliation dialogue will
advance that departure date.
RECOMMENDATION 34: The question of the future U.S. force presence must be
on the table for discussion as the national reconciliation dialogue takes place. Its inclu-
546 IRAQ AND THE GULF WARS