sion will increase the likelihood of participation by insurgents and militia leaders, and
thereby increase the possibilities for success.
Violence cannot end unless dialogue begins, and the dialogue must involve those
who wield power, not simply those who hold political office. The United States must
try to talk directly to Grand Ayatollah Sistani and must consider appointing a high-
level American Shia Muslim to serve as an emissary to him. The United States must
also try to talk directly to Moqtada al-Sadr, to militia leaders, and to insurgent lead-
ers. The United Nations can help facilitate contacts.
RECOMMENDATION 35: The United States must make active efforts to engage all
parties in Iraq, with the exception of al Qaeda. The United States must find a way to
talk to Grand Ayatollah Sistani, Moqtada al-Sadr, and militia and insurgent leaders.
The very focus on sectarian identity that endangers Iraq also presents opportuni-
ties to seek broader support for a national reconciliation dialogue. Working with Iraqi
leaders, the international community and religious leaders can play an important role
in fostering dialogue and reconciliation across the sectarian divide. The United States
should actively encourage the constructive participation of all who can take part in
advancing national reconciliation within Iraq.
RECOMMENDATION 36: The United States should encourage dialogue between
sectarian communities, as outlined in the New Diplomatic Offensive above. It should
press religious leaders inside and outside Iraq to speak out on behalf of peace and
reconciliation.
Finally, amnesty proposals from the Iraqi government are an important incentive
in reconciliation talks and they need to be generous. Amnesty proposals to once-
bitter enemies will be difficult for the United States to accept, just as they will be dif-
ficult for the Iraqis to make. Yet amnesty is an issue to be grappled with by the Iraqis,
not by Americans. Despite being politically unpopular—in the United States as well
as in Iraq—amnesty is essential if progress is to take place. Iraqi leaders need to be
certain that they have U.S. support as they move forward with this critical element of
national reconciliation.
RECOMMENDATION 37: Iraqi amnesty proposals must not be undercut in Wash-
ington by either the executive or the legislative branch.
Militias and National ReconciliationThe use of force by the government of Iraq is appropriate and necessary to stop mili-
tias that act as death squads or use violence against institutions of the state. However,
solving the problem of militias requires national reconciliation.
Dealing with Iraq’s militias will require long-term attention, and substantial fund-
ing will be needed to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate militia members into civil-
ian society. Around the world, this process of transitioning members of irregular mil-
itary forces from civil conflict to new lives once a peace settlement takes hold is
familiar. The disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of militias depends on
national reconciliation and on confidence-building measures among the parties to that
reconciliation.
IRAQ AND THE GULF WARS 547