should continue for the coming year. In addition to this training, Iraqi combat units
need supervised on-the-job training as they move to field operations. This on-the-job
training could be best done by imbedding more U.S. military personnel in Iraqi
deployed units. The number of imbedded personnel would be based on the recom-
mendation of our military commanders in Iraq, but it should be large enough to accel-
erate the development of a real combat capability in Iraqi Army units. Such a mission
could involve 10,000 to 20,000 American troops instead of the 3,000 to 4,000 now
in this role. This increase in imbedded troops could be carried out without an aggre-
gate increase over time in the total number of troops in Iraq by making a correspon-
ding decrease in troops assigned to U.S. combat brigades.
Another mission of the U.S. military would be to assist Iraqi deployed brigades
with intelligence, transportation, air support, and logistics support, as well as provid-
ing some key equipment.
A vital mission of the U.S. military would be to maintain rapid-reaction teams
and special operations teams. These teams would be available to undertake strike mis-
sions against al Qaeda in Iraq when the opportunity arises, as well as for other mis-
sions considered vital by the U.S. commander in Iraq.
The performance of the Iraqi Army could also be significantly improved if it had
improved equipment. One source could be equipment left behind by departing U.S.
units. The quickest and most effective way for the Iraqi Army to get the bulk of their
equipment would be through our Foreign Military Sales program, which they have
already begun to use.
While these efforts are building up, and as additional Iraqi brigades are being
deployed, U.S. combat brigades could begin to move out of Iraq. By the first quarter
of 2008, subject to unexpected developments in the security situation on the ground,
all combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq. At that
time, U.S. combat forces in Iraq could be deployed only in units embedded with Iraqi
forces, in rapid-reaction and special operations teams, and in training, equipping,
advising, force protection, and search and rescue. Intelligence and support efforts
would continue. Even after the United States has moved all combat brigades out of
Iraq, we would maintain a considerable military presence in the region, with our still
significant force in Iraq and with our powerful air, ground, and naval deployments in
Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar, as well as an increased presence in Afghanistan. These
forces would be sufficiently robust to permit the United States, working with the Iraqi
government, to accomplish four missions:
- Provide political reassurance to the Iraqi government in order to avoid its col-
lapse and the disintegration of the country. - Fight al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations in Iraq using special operations
teams. - Train, equip, and support the Iraqi security forces.
- Deter even more destructive interference in Iraq by Syria and Iran.
Because of the importance of Iraq to our regional security goals and to our ongoing
fight against al Qaeda, we considered proposals to make a substantial increase (100,000
to 200,000) in the number of U.S. troops in Iraq. We rejected this course because we
do not believe that the needed levels are available for a sustained deployment.Further,
IRAQ AND THE GULF WARS 549