Clinton tried in July 2000 to replicate Carter’s success at Camp David, this time
by attempting to force Israeli and PLO officials to agree to a peace deal ending their
dispute. In this case, Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak offered concessions, but they
were not enough for Arafat, and the effort failed. Two months later, Palestinians
launched a widespread uprising against Israel that resulted in thousands of deaths and
extensive destruction over the next several years. Nonetheless, Clinton’s aides tried
again to wrest a deal. Israeli and Palestinian negotiators met in Washington in Decem-
ber and in Taba, Egypt, in January 2001. They again came close to reaching agree-
ment, but in the context of the violence and an impending Israeli election, it was not
close enough. As part of this exercise, Clinton presented to Israel and the Palestinians
what he called “parameters” for an eventual peace between them, but neither side fully
embraced them before Clinton left office. Many people on both sides believe that Clin-
ton’s ideas remain the most logical basis for such a peace.
In March 2002, with the worsening of Israeli-Palestinian violence, Saudi Arabia’s
de facto ruler, Crown Prince Abdallah, introduced a plan in which Arab nations would
make peace with Israel if it abandoned the territories occupied since 1967. Arab lead-
ers embraced the plan at an Arab League summit in Beirut, but a Palestinian suicide
bombing in Israel overshadowed their acceptance. Israel dismissed the Arab initiative
at that point, only to give it a cautious endorsement nearly five years later when the
United States suddenly seized on Abdallah’s ideas as offering the potential for yet
another round of diplomacy.
ARABS AND ISRAELIS 41