In London, yet another examination of the situation led the British government
to switch its policy once again. Another panel, the Palestine Partition Commission,
concluded in November 1938 that the Peel Commission’s plan would not work.
The government then issued a statement withdrawing its earlier endorsement of par-
tition and calling instead for an “understanding” between Arabs and Jews. Rather
than bringing long-term peace to Palestine, the Peel Commission report was fol-
lowed by an expansion of the violence that had led to the commission’s appoint-
ment in the first place. By the time it was quelled in August 1939, three years of
violence had resulted in the deaths of nearly 3,800 Arabs, 2,400 Jews, and some 600
British.
Although its precise recommendations were never carried out, the Peel Com-
mission’s report did represent an important step in the process leading up to the
establishment of Israel in 1948: The commission was the first official body to advo-
cate partition—something the UN General Assembly would endorse in 1947. In
addition, its pessimistic assessment of the situation in Palestine proved to be more
accurate than the often optimistic statements of senior British officials (Partition of
Palestine, p. 56).
In May 1939, a new British government issued a new white paper proposing an
independent, unified Palestine of Arabs and Jews within ten years; in the meantime,
restrictions would be tightened on Jewish immigration to ensure that Jews remained
a minority unless the Arabs agreed otherwise. Under this white paper, 25,000 Jews
would be allowed into Palestine immediately, but no more than 75,000 would be
allowed during the next five years. These restrictions angered Zionist leaders, who
viewed them as a betrayal of British promises since the Balfour Declaration to support
large-scale Jewish emigration to Palestine. One motivation for this change of policy,
according to most historians, was Britain’s desire to dissuade Arab leaders in the Mid-
dle East from aligning with Nazi Germany.
During the course of World War II, Britain generally enforced the immigration
limits set out in the 1939 White Paper, in some cases turning away boats loaded with
Jewish refugees fleeing Europe. In the most dramatic case, the SS Struma,carrying
refugees from Romania, was refused entry to Palestine and sank in February 1942
shortly after leaving the harbor of Istanbul; 767 men, women, and children died. The
incident deeply angered Zionists, who blamed the British government.
Historians have offered conflicting assessments of the actual impact of the 1939
White Paper, however. Some argue that many Jews could have been saved from the
Holocaust in Europe if an escape route to Palestine had been an option. Others con-
tend that only a massive increase in emigration would have saved large numbers of
Jews, and Palestine could not absorb hundreds of thousands or millions of refugees,
even in the event such an exodus could have been arranged during the war.
Following are excerpts from the “Official Summary” of the report of the Palestine
Royal Commission, chaired by Lord Robert Peel, and dated June 22, 1937. The
British government published the report on July 7, 1937. The summary appears as
an appendix to the full report.44 ARABS AND ISRAELIS