DIESKAU, JEAN-ARMAND
Dieskau, Jean-Armand
(1701–September 8, 1767)
French Army Officer
D
ieskau was the capable French second
in command during initial phases of
the French and Indian War. However,
by violating strict instructions not to divide
his army, he was beaten by the British at the
Battle of Lake George and captured.
Baron Jean-Armand Dieskau was born in
the German state of Saxony in 1701 and
joined the military at an early age. Like many
German mercenaries he journeyed to France
in 1720; he was appointed aide-de-camp to
Maurice de Saxe, the great French marshal.
For the next two and a half decades, Dieskau
accompanied de Saxe in his numerous cam-
paigns and was present at the victory of
Fontenoy in 1745 as a cavalry colonel.
Dieskau was apparently a thoroughly compe-
tent professional soldier, and in 1747 he made
major general and gained appointment as mil-
itary governor of Brest, an important French
naval base. Prior to the onset of the French
and Indian War in 1755, he was dispatched to
Canada as second in command under Gover-
nor-General Pierre de Rigaud de Vaudreuil.
He arrived at Quebec that March, being in
control of French regular forces, but com-
pletely subordinate to Vaudreuil in matters of
military strategy.
The defeat of British Gen. Edward Brad-
dock at Monongahela in July 1755 resulted in
the capture of his official papers. Through
them, the French were alerted to forthcoming
British offensives and drew up plans of their
own to counter them. Vaudreuil considered
an anticipated British assault upon Fort St.
Frederic (Crown Point, New York), particu-
larly menacing to New France, so he in-
structed Dieskau to preempt enemy plans by
reducing British forts at Oswego. While as-
sembling an army of 4,000 regulars, militia,
and Indians at Fort Frontenac (present-day
Kingston, Ontario), Dieskau learned of an im-
pending British attack against Fort St. Fred-
eric conducted by Col. William Johnson. Vau-
dreuil promptly recalled Dieskau to Montreal
in August 1755 and dispatched French forces
down the Richelieu River to intercept the
Americans near Lake George. Prior to depart-
ing, Dieskau was specifically advised by the
governor-general to keep his force united to
ensure maximum military effectiveness.
En route, Dieskau paused briefly to erect a
new fort at Carillon (Ticonderoga) before pro-
ceeding with 1,500 regulars, 1,000 militia, and
600 Indians. Johnson approached from the
south at the head of 3,000 militia and 300 Mo-
hawk Indians. Once informed of Dieskau’s ac-
tivities, Johnson fortified the head of Lake
George by erecting a primitive work that later
evolved into Fort William Henry. Dieskau
watched British movements carefully, and he
anticipated that the bulk of Johnson’s forces
were divided. Intelligence was received that
only 500 regulars protected his main base at
Fort Edward, 14 miles below the lake. Seek-
ing to capture the fort’s garrison while possi-
bly isolating Johnson at Lake George, Dieskau
thereupon ordered an immediate advance. It
was an audacious move, yet he divided his
army against orders, advancing with only 200
regulars, 600 militia, and 700 Indians. The
bulk of his forces, 1,300 regulars and 400 mili-
tia, remained behind at Ticonderoga to pro-
tect it from attack. The French commander
was acutely aware that regular soldiers were
a precious commodity and could not be easily
replaced, so he sought to preserve them. His-
torians today attribute this fatal parceling to
Dieskau’s disdain for the colonial troops op-
posing him.
Approaching Fort Edward, the French In-
dians grew skittish and stated that they would
not attack there owing to the presence of
many large cannons. Dieskau had little re-
course other than to suggest hitting Johnson’s
main force at Lake George, which was then