GAGE, THOMAS
ward overcautiousness, and the following
year Gen. Jeffrey Amherst assigned him com-
mand of his rear guard, a less-demanding role.
Montreal fell in September 1760, and
Amherst, overlooking Gage’s previous blun-
der, allowed him to serve as governor of that
city for the next three years. Tactful, honest,
and courteous, he went to great lengths to be-
friend the French upper classes and ensured a
smooth and peaceful transition to British rule.
In many respects the good feeling he gener-
ated carried over into the regime of the next
governor, Guy Carleton.
Gage’s reputation as a competent military
administrator held him in good stead when,
following Amherst’s return to England in
1763, he was promoted to major general and
selected to serve as acting commander in
chief for North America, headquartered at
New York City. The following year, when
Amherst declined to return, Gage was offi-
cially nominated for the post. Over the next
decade he managed military affairs during the
suppression of Pontiac’s Rebellion in 1763,
the regulation of the fur trade and westward
colonial expansion, and the most cost-effec-
tive manner of maintaining and paying for siz-
able British garrisons in the New World. He
was also responsible for advising various
royal governors on military affairs, as well as
overseeing enforcement of imperial policy re-
lating to colonial rule. Gage again acquitted
himself competently and without contro-
versy; however, storm clouds were appearing
that he could have scarcely anticipated, let
alone controlled.
Colonial resentment over the issue of tax-
ation without parliamentary representation
began in earnest with the Stamp Act of 1765
and fluctuated up and down over the next 10
years. Each succeeding attempt to impose
taxes triggered a chorus of condemnation
and mounting civil disobedience. The com-
mercial center of Boston soon emerged as a
hotbed of resistance to various taxation
schemes and culminated in the so-called
Boston Tea Party of December 1773,
whereby British merchandise was dumped
into the harbor. The government responded
with a variety of harsh measures that were
especially repugnant to colonial citizens. The
Quartering Act, for example, allowed for
British soldiers to be fed and housed in pri-
vate homes. The Port Act sought to punish
Boston for its belligerence by closing it with
military force. Far from intimidating the
colonies, this measure served as a rallying
point for what was perceived as a British
conspiracy against personal liberty. Gage, a
staunch supporter of imperial will, felt that
the colonies should pay the taxes necessary
to maintain the army in America. As early as
1767, he also recommended using force, if
necessary, to obtain compliance. However,
Gage himself was unwilling to resort to vio-
lence without first securing permission from
civilian authority. Meanwhile, colonial citi-
zens across America started arming them-
selves and enrolling in militia companies for
self-defense. To many on either side, it
seemed as if an armed confrontation with
the motherland was inevitable.
Gage was on leave during these proceed-
ings from 1773 to 1774, when he visited En-
gland to attend to personal affairs. The distin-
guished Swiss mercenary, Gen. Frederick
Haldimand, served as acting commander in
chief during his absence. Gage, meanwhile,
was cognizant of what was afoot, and he
warned the monarchy that stronger mea-
sures—and the means to enforce them—
were needed to keep the colonies in line. The
government was pleased with his perform-
ance as commander in chief, along with his
vocal support for civilian authority, which he
truly respected and tried to uphold. For this
reason, the ministry saw fit to install Gage as
royal governor of Massachusetts to replace
the outgoing Thomas Hutchinson. He now
became responsible for the imposition of the
so-called Intolerable Acts, as they became
known in Boston, but the government antici-
pated that his tact and common sense would
go far to defuse the mounting crisis. Gage ar-
rived at Boston in May 1774 and was warmly
received by officials. His popularity, unfortu-