save for the Eastern Front against Russia. The
conquest of Poland, as well as the fall of Nor-
way and France, all bore the unmistakable
stamp of his prompt and efficient planning.
He also shielded Hitler from bad news or any-
thing that looked potentially unsettling. In
1940, when Gen. Johannes Blaskowitzcriti-
cized German atrocities in Poland, Jodl re-
buked him and dismissed his report as “un-
called for.” He also sided with the Führer in
general discussions of strategy. Hitler re-
warded this devotion by promoting him to
general of artillery in 1940 and colonel gen-
eral in 1944. Following the defeat of German
armies outside Moscow in December 1941,
Hitler grew dissatisfied with his generals, and
he usurped OKW entirely, becoming the sole
strategic authority on the Eastern Front.
Hitler’s stubbornness, unrealistic expecta-
tions, and all-around incompetence as a
strategist harbored disastrous consequences
for Germany. Jodl, a highly competent mili-
tary thinker, was well positioned to question
some of Hitler’s more outlandish decisions,
but he never mustered the courage to try. As
the tide of the war ground inexorably against
Germany, Jodl steadfastly refused to confront
Hitler about his delusional directives. At best,
he did manage to constrain Hitler’s ranting ex-
cesses and partially mitigated some of his
strategic disasters.
Like many senior German commanders,
Jodl seriously miscalculated where the Allies
would land in Europe and in what force. In
January 1944, he was dispatched to Nor-
mandy to review beach defenses with Gen.
Erwin Rommel, concluded they were inade-
quate, and convinced Hitler to increase sup-
plies and resources to that theater. He was
stunned by the strength of the D-Day invasion
at Normandy on June 6, 1944, then refused to
wake a sleeping Hitler while Gen. Gerd von
Rundstedtpleaded for reinforcements. Not
surprisingly, Jodl was by Hitler’s side during
the failed bomb plot of July 1944 and was
slightly wounded. Then, with German forces
having been stampeded out of France, he
planned and authorized Hitler’s Ardennes of-
fensive in December 1944. This ill-advised un-
dertaking, better known as the Battle of the
Bulge, consumed the final German reserves,
but Jodl castigated fellow officers for not em-
bracing Hitler’s abilities. “I must testify that
he is the soul not only of the political but also
of the military conduct of the war,” he de-
clared, “and that the force of his willpower
and the creative riches of his thought animate
and hold together the whole Wehrmacht.” Fol-
lowing the dictator’s suicide that April, Jodl
was authorized by Adm. Karl Dönitz, head of
the provisional government, to serve as his
representative at Rhiems. There he signed the
articles of capitulation on May 8, 1945.
Shortly after Germany’s surrender, Jodl
was arrested by Allied authorities and
charged with war crimes. During his trial at
the International Military Court at Nurem-
berg, he was found guilty on four counts and
sentenced to be hanged. The placid general
simply responded that, as a good soldier, he
was simply following the orders of his supe-
rior. Jodl was led to the gallows on October
16, 1946. However, five years later, a German
war-crimes court reviewed his case and con-
cluded that he had, in fact, restricted his ac-
tivity to military affairs and not broken the
law. Jodl thus became one of few senior Nazi
officials posthumously exonerated of war
crimes, a dubious distinction. Although a
competent soldier and staff officer, Jodl could
not detach himself from Hitler’s megaloma-
nia—and paid the ultimate price.See also
Blaskowitz, Johannes; Dönitz, Karl; Hitler, Adolf; Keitel,
Wilhelm; Rommel, Erwin; Rundstedt, Gerd vonBibliography
Barnett, Correlli, ed. Hitler’s Generals. New York:
Grove Weidenfield, 1989; Brett-Smith, Richard.
Hitler’s Generals.London: Osprey, 1976; Chant,
Christopher, ed. Hitler’s Generals and Their Battles.
London: Salamander Books, 1977; Gorlitz, Walter.
History of the German General Staff, 1657–1945.
Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1995; Humble,JODL, ALFRED