velous tenacity and courage, but German
losses were approximately twice as large as
England’s. Kesselring originated the strategy
of bombing RAF airfields as a direct way of
stripping British aerial defenses, but, with
Göring, he eventually approved Hitler’s shift-
ing of priorities from military to civilian tar-
gets. This proved a gross strategic miscalcula-
tion, for it granted the hard-pressed British
Fighter Command the time needed to regroup
and finally win the battle. Consequently, the
Germans canceled their intended invasion of
England. Hitler was nonetheless pleased by
Kesselring’s performance as an air chief, and
in July 1940 he was elevated to field marshal.
The following spring he transferred his refur-
bished command to Poland in anticipation of
invading Russia. Throughout the summer and
fall, waves of his bombers spearheaded Gen.
Fedor von Bock’s armored columns during
the drive to Moscow. His talents were sud-
denly required on another front, and in the fall
of 1941 Kesselring established new headquar-
ters at Rome.
Now situated as commander in chief
South, Kesselring accepted responsibility for
conducting the war in North Africa. His mis-
sion also included shoring up the flagging de-
fenses of Italian dictatorBenito Mussolini,
as well as coordinating supplies and offensive
moves by German forces. His brilliant but
mercurial subordinate, Gen. Erwin Rommel,
proved difficult to restrain at a distance, yet
the British were nearly run out of Egypt. But
lengthening supply lines posed difficult prob-
lems, and Kesselring advocated capturing the
British-held island of Malta. He then began an
11-day aerial offensive against airfields, port
facilities, and defenses, but Hitler suddenly
canceled the invasion, sending most of
Kesselring’s aircraft to Russia. Within six
months, U.S. forces under Gen. Dwight D.
Eisenhower had landed in Algeria and began
pressing east while victorious British forces
under Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery
advanced to the west. Rommel was caught be-
tween the pincer, and Kesselring helped or-
chestrate an effective rear-guard action. How-
ever, an ambitious and possibly decisive
counterblow was lost when Rommel’s attack
through Kasserine Pass was not properly sup-
ported by forces under Gen. Hans-Jurgen
Arnim. By May 1943, it no longer mattered, as
Allied forces captured the whole of Tunisia
and all German forces stationed there. The
focus of war now shifted to Italy.
Given the gravity of the situation, Kessel-
ring arrived in Sicily to direct its defense per-
sonally. When the Allied invasion materialized
that July, it proved unstoppable, but he
nonetheless executed a brilliant fighting with-
drawal whereby 100,000 German soldiers and
10,000 vehicles were evacuated to the main-
land. He then spent several weeks preparing
for the defense of Italy, a rugged, mountain-
ous peninsula that neutralized most Allied ad-
vantages in tanks and manpower. Over the
next 20 months, Kesselring proved himself a
master at defensive tactics. American forces
under Gen. Mark Clark landed at Salerno on
September 9, 1943, which partly caught the
defenders by surprise, but Kesselring rushed
men and tanks to the threatened zone and
nearly pushed the Allies into the sea. For the
remainder of the war, German forces gave
ground slowly and in good order, making their
enemy pay heavily for every inch of terrain.
Snug in their positions along the well-pre-
pared defensive position designated the Gus-
tav Line, Kesselring’s men defied several hard-
pressed attempts to evict them. From
November 1943 to May 1944, the strong points
around Monte Cassino under Gen. Fridolin
von Senger und Etterlinwere an embar-
rassing thorn in Clark’s side. Frustrated by a
lack of success, the Allies tried mounting an
end run around the Germans by landing at
Anzio, near Rome. Kesselring reacted with his
usual promptness and the beachhead was
contained. It was not until May 1944 that the
Germans forcibly abandoned the Gustav Line,
which enabled the Americans to finally enter
Rome. The defenders, meanwhile, fell back to
prepared positions called the Gothic Line, and
the entire bloody process repeated itself. De-
spite numerical superiority and command ofKESSELRING, ALBERT