inability to follow up his victory angered the
governor-general. Again, Levis remained
diplomatic toward both parties and astutely
steered a neutral path. In fact, Vaudreuil was
so impressed by his performance that he ad-
vised superiors back in France to promote
Levis to major general.
In the spring of 1758, Vaudreuil conceived
a strategy whereby Levis and 3,000 men
would be dispatched into the heart of Iro-
quois territory. His mission was not so much
an attack as an attempt to cow that tribe into
changing its alliance from England to
France. However, Levis had no sooner em-
barked on his mission than he was speedily
recalled back to reinforce Fort Carillon
(Ticonderoga) in New York. He arrived just
as an English army of 15,000 men under Gen.
James Abercromby was positioning itself to
attack. Levis was posted to the exposed right
flank, which Abercromby made no attempt
to turn, and was conspicuously engaged in
the disastrous repulse of July 8, 1758. When
Montcalm again gave the appearance of
being unwilling to follow up on a victory,
Vaudreuil demanded his recall back to
France and replacement by Levis. Levis was,
in fact, promoted to major general, but when
the government decided to leave Montcalm
in command, he graciously accepted his con-
tinuing role as a subordinate.
The tempo of events quickened in the sum-
mer of 1759 when an army and fleet under
Gen. James Wolfe arrived off Quebec. Levis
argued strenuously with Montcalm that
French forces should not remain in the city
and be trapped there. At length, he was al-
lowed to take a picked force to guard the
shoreline from St. Charles to Montmorency.
Levis’s foresight was rewarded on July 31,
1757, when Wolfe made an attempted landing
at Montmorency and French forces defeated
him handily. Subsequent British gains at Fort
Niagara in western New York then convinced
Montcalm that a possible offensive against
Montreal was in the offing, and in August he
dispatched Levis to that city with 800 men.
Thus, Levis was absent during the decisive
British victory over French forces on the
Plains of Abraham, September 13, 1759, in
which both Wolfe and Montcalm were slain.
Levis, now senior commander, hurried back
to Quebec to collect the disorganized rem-
nants of French forces and shepherded them
back to Montreal. Over the ensuing winter he
made great strides in improving morale and
integrating Canadian militia with regular
forces. Levis also struck up a cordial written
relationship with Gen. James Murray, now
commanding the English garrison at Quebec.
The two erstwhile enemies remained friends
for life.
In the spring of 1760, Levis became con-
vinced that Quebec could and should be re-
captured at any cost. He authorized an active
war of outposts against English forces, pre-
vented them from foraging, and allowed
scurvy to do its work. By March, Murray’s
7,000-man garrison had dwindled to half its
strength, and Levis set out to engage him. On
April 28, 1760, Murray’s 4,000 soldiers met a
similar force under Levis at Saint Foy, not far
from where Montcalm and Wolf had died.
After a stiff fight, the British right flank was
turned, and Murray hastily withdrew back to
the city with heavy losses. Levis then laid
siege to the town in hopeful anticipation of
reinforcements from French ships on the St.
Lawrence River. When ships did appear in
May, they turned out to be British, so Levis
abandoned Quebec and fell back to Mon-
treal. The British responded with a three-
pronged advance on that city, which con-
vinced Governor-General Vaudreuil that the
war was lost. On September 6, 1760, articles
of capitulation were drawn up by Gen. Jef-
frey Amherst, but Levis, seeing they denied
the French garrison honors of war, strongly
protested. He clearly preferred to fight
rather than dishonor himself and the men
under his command. Vaudreuil, not given to
such niceties, commanded him to accept the
terms as written. He obeyed, but Levis flatly
refused to meet with Amherst or extend anyLEVIS, FRANÇOIS-GASTON