time was right for a massive blow to knock
Russia out of the war. This was strategically
imperative, for Germany was severely disad-
vantaged fighting along two fronts. But Ger-
man planning became ensnared by conflict-
ing strategic priorities. The current chief of
staff, Erich von Falkenhayn, sought a deci-
sive victory in the West by taking troops from
the Russian front and pouring them into a
bloody battle of attrition at Verdun. Hinden-
burg and Ludendorff strongly protested these
transfers, but even with smaller forces they
nearly drove Russian forces out of Poland in
- When Falkenhayn’s strategy failed at
Verdun, he was replaced by Hindenburg. The
egotistical Ludendorff, who did not wish to
be referred to as a mere deputy chief of staff,
was also granted the title of first quartermas-
ter general of armies. The conduct of German
armies for the remainder of World War I was
now in their hands—and they resolved to win
at any cost.
Although the junior partner in this dynamic
duo, Ludendorff was by far the most influen-
tial and aggressive. In the spring of 1917 he
planned the successful Caporetto offensive
for Austria, which nearly knocked Italy out of
the war. His directions then led to the col-
lapse and acquisition of Romania. Meanwhile,
the nominally detached Hindenburg content-
edly functioned as a figurehead, allowing Lu-
dendorff to implement wide-ranging military
and economic policies in his superior’s name.
A failure of nerve on the part of Kaiser Wil-
helm II, who feared and detested Ludendorff,
coupled with the reluctance of politicians to
question his motives, meant he was literally a
military dictator. As such he oversaw the in-
troduction of forced Belgian labor, increases
in military expenditures, and conscription to
shore Germany’s flagging army. He also arro-
gantly dismissed the thought of a negotiated
peace settlement as national weakness. But
most important, Hindenburg and Ludendorff
felt that a six-month naval blockade by U-
boats would bring England to its knees.
Therefore, over the objections of Chancellor
Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, who was
sacked at Ludendorff’s instigation, Germany
reenacted the policy of unlimited submarine
warfare at sea. Henceforth, the ships of neu-
tral carriers such as the United States were li-
able to attack if they traded with England.
Like his superior, Ludendorff realized this
policy would eventually result in America’s
declaration of war against Germany, but they
felt time was on their side. In October 1917,
horrendous Russian losses prompted the Bol-
shevik Revolution, which forced the giant in
the east to sue for peace. This act released
thousands of German soldiers for service
along the Western Front, where they were
needed as reinforcements. Both Hindenburg
and Ludendorff optimistically predicted that
Germany could crush France and England be-
fore the United States mobilized its military
resources and manpower against the Father-
land. It was a high-stakes strategic gamble,
but one for which Germany—thanks to Lu-
dendorff—was well-prepared.
Through the fall of 1917, Ludendorff over-
saw the development of new infantry tactics
intent upon breaking the strategic stalemate.
This entailed training German troops in the
new “storm trooper” tactics, whereby small
bodies of highly trained specialists, backed by
artillery, would infiltrate along enemy-held
strong points and attack rear areas. This was
a complete departure from the mass bom-
bardment and mass infantry attacks that had
characterized fighting since 1914. This estab-
lished Ludendorff as a brilliant tactical inno-
vator, whose ideas anticipated what became
standard practice in World War II 20 years
later. In March 1918, the new German offen-
sive sprang at the Allies along a 50-mile front
with resounding success, sending trench-
bound French and English forces reeling in
confusion. After a series of interrelated offen-
sives, German armies were once again poised
to cross the Marne River in June 1918. Luden-
dorff’s gamble thus far appeared successful,
but it carried a fearsome price: 500,000 men
had been killed and wounded.
Unfortunately for Germany, Ludendorff’s
faith in the offensive blinded him to the factLUDENDORFF, ERICHVON