The American Revolu-
tion had broken out in
April and was spreading
northward. In this capac-
ity Arbuthnot dispatched
troops to the relief of
Fort Cumberland, then
besieged by American Pa-
triot forces, and also
guarded against Ameri-
can privateers by arming
private vessels. On Janu-
ary 23, 1778, Arbuthnot
was promoted to rear ad-
miral and recalled to En-
gland for consultation.
There this anonymous and
relatively undistinguished
officer learned of his pro-
motion to commander of
the North American sta-
tion. This critical assign-
ment is difficult to account for, as seapower
was viewed by the English government as a
strategic asset in its war against the United
States, requiring leadership that was dynamic,
far-seeing, and determined. Considering Ar-
buthnot’s conspicuous lack of such qualities,
his appointment to this vital post can only be
ascribed to the ineptitude of Lord Sandwich
and the British Admiralty.
In his capacity as naval commander, Ar-
buthnot was required to display both cordial-
ity and patience with his army equivalent, the
thin-skinned and highly irascible Gen. Henry
Clinton. The admiral, unfortunately, was cut
much from the same cloth, being tactless and
overly sensitive about his own reputation.
And despite a long career, he had acquired lit-
tle more than a reputation as a self-centered
bully. Worse, his grasp of strategy was ques-
tionable and seemed punctuated by long peri-
ods of indecision and inactivity. Arbuthnot ar-
rived at New York in May 1779 and replaced
the aggressive and highly capable Com-
modore George Collier. As predicted, the
admiral and the general developed a thinly
disguised mutual loathing, which militated
against the close cooper-
ation necessary to win
the war. Arbuthnot re-
mained inactive at New
York throughout the win-
ter and spring of 1778 and
was stirred to action only
by the reputed approach
of French Adm. Charles
Hector Theodat d’Es-
taing. The French were
expected to launch a
major amphibious attack
upon Newport, Rhode Is-
land, but Arbuthnot, ig-
noring repeated pleas
from Clinton, hesitated to
either reinforce or evacu-
ate the British garrison
there. Fortunately for the
English, d’Estaing made
an ineffectual attack
upon Savannah, Georgia, in 1779, then with-
drew. Arbuthnot’s reluctance to seek out the
enemy made Clinton privately long for a co-
operative leader in the mold of the recently
departed Adm. Richard Howe.
In December 1779, Arbuthnot roused him-
self from lethargy and transported a large part
of Clinton’s army from New York to
Charleston, South Carolina. The tottering ad-
miral tried mending fences with Clinton by
pledging his complete cooperation and
landed a number of artillery pieces to support
land operations. The ensuing blockade and
siege culminated in the surrender of Conti-
nental forces under American Gen. Benjamin
Lincoln that May. Arbuthnot then transported
Clinton back to New York, leaving southern
operations in the capable hands of Lord
Charles Cornwallis. However, the two lead-
ers failed to strike up cordial relations, or
even mutual accord, over what was required
from their respective forces. This impasse, in
turn, militated against the bold strokes neces-
sary to defeat the Americans.
By June 1780, the British were alerted by the
traitor Benedict Arnoldthat a large FrenchARBUTHNOT, MARRIOT
Marriot Arbuthnot
National Maritime Museum